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Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 35 of Security Council resolution 2232 (2015), in which the Council requested me to report on the implementation of the resolution, including the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) by 12 September. The report covers the major developments that occurred during the period from 1 May to 31 August 2015.

II. Political and security overview

A. Political developments

2. The Federal Government of Somalia accelerated efforts to advance the process of building a federal state. However, on 28 July, the Federal Parliament passed a resolution indicating that a country-wide "one-person-one-vote" election would not be possible in 2016 owing to delays in the political process and remaining technical and security challenges, confirming the consensus that had emerged among key stakeholders. On 15 August, the Federal Government circulated an action plan setting out arrangements for national consultations to agree on options for a yet to be defined "electoral process" to replace the current members of the Somali Federal Government and Parliament when their terms expire in 2016.

3. Political tensions re-emerged when, on 12 August, Members of the Federal Parliament submitted a motion to the Office of the Speaker for the impeachment of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. The motion, signed by 95 Members of Parliament out of a total of 275, accused the President of extensive corruption, infringement of the Constitution and poor leadership. A swift resolution appeared to be unlikely. International partners called on the Somali federal institutions to maintain their unity and cohesion and to focus on the priorities set by Somalis for the wider peace process.

4. There was overall progress on the formation of federal states throughout the country. On 7 May, the Juba Regional Assembly was inaugurated in Kismaayo, Juba Hoose, amid criticism from some parties over inclusiveness. On 6 June, the Federal Parliament passed a motion to "terminate" the Juba Regional Assembly, a decision

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that was rejected by the Interim Juba Administration. While the Federal Government has established a ministerial committee to resolve the issue, it has yet to begin work. The Juba Regional Assembly subsequently elected Sheikh Ahmed Islam "Madobe", leader of the Interim Juba Administration, as President of the Interim Juba Administration on 15 August. He called on the Assembly to work with him to resolve the issues over its composition. On 9 August, in the Interim South-West Administration, President Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, formally launched the process to form a South-West Regional Assembly.

5. In mid-June, a state formation conference took place in Cadaado, Galguduud region, for the purpose of creating the new Galmudug Interim Administration in the central regions. The conference formed a regional assembly which, on 4 July, elected Abdikarim Hussein Guled as President. The Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a group, which occupies parts of the Galguduud region, including Dhuusamarreeb, boycotted the process. On 27 August, however, factions from the group entered into an agreement with the Galmudug Interim Administration to join the state in exchange for political and constitutional concessions. Puntland's administration initially denounced the Galmudug Interim Administration as unconstitutional, owing partly to its claim over northern Mudug region, which was long considered to be part of Puntland. Following discussions between the Federal Prime Minister and the President of Puntland, the Galmudug Interim Administration revised its constitution on 29 July to remove any claim to northern Mudug.

6. On 8 August, the Federal Government launched a process to form an interim administration for the Hiraan and Shabelle Dhexe regions by 1 December 2015. The process will be managed by a technical committee and overseen by a steering group comprising 12 Federal Cabinet Ministers from the area and local governors.

7. In "Somaliland", the upper legislative chamber, the House of Elders (*Guurti*) announced on 11 May a 22-month term extension of the term of office of President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamud "Silanyo", thereby delaying the elections that had been scheduled to be held in June 2016 until March 2017. Following protests and consultations, the authorities and the opposition parties agreed on 27 May to reschedule the elections for mid-December 2016. However, tensions remained high, as the *Guurti* failed to revise its decision in line with the agreement. On 18 August, in response to a request from the "Somaliland" authorities for a legal decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the *Guurti*'s decision, and set the election timeline for March 2017.

B. Security developments

8. The holy month of Ramadan and the preceding weeks saw an increase in attacks by Al-Shabaab in central and south-central Somalia. On 18 June, the first day of Ramadan, security forces in Cadaado thwarted a complex attack by three gunmen who attempted to enter the venue of the central regions state formation conference after detonating a vehicle laden with explosives; the four attackers were the only casualties.

9. On 11 June, a convoy of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was ambushed by a large number of Al-Shabaab fighters at Jama'a village, Bay region. A reinforcement of AMISOM troops to Jama'a was ambushed twice by Al-Shabaab on 12 June. On 26 June, over 100 Al-Shabaab fighters stormed an

AMISOM base in Leego, Bay Region, after detonating a vehicle-borne bomb, resulting in a significant number of AMISOM casualties, and several soldiers of the mission were reported as missing in action. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility, citing its Abu Zubeyr Battalion, a new military unit named after the late Al-Shabaab leader.

10. In Kismaayo, a training camp of the Somali national army located at the old Kismaayo airport was targeted with a car bomb on 22 August, resulting in at least 18 fatalities among Somali national army personnel and injuries to at least 44 others, including three AMISOM soldiers.

11. In Mogadishu, during Ramadan, there was a surge in targeted assassinations and complex attacks, for which Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility. On 10 July, 11 civilians were reported killed and at least 20 injured in two consecutive complex attacks at two hotels. On 25 July, a Member of Parliament was killed in a drive-by shooting together with his bodyguard and driver. On 26 July, a truck laden with explosives detonated outside the Jazeera Palace Hotel, killing 15 people, including one member of the Chinese diplomatic mission residing at the hotel. The blast caused significant damage to the hotel and nearby buildings, including United Nations compounds on Airport Road. Al-Shabaab stated that the attack had targeted foreign diplomatic entities housed inside the hotel. Another car bomb attack was carried out by Al-Shabaab on 22 August, targeting a restaurant frequented by Somali security personnel, resulting in the death of 6 people, including 2 civilians, and injuries to 18 others.

12. On 19 July, AMISOM and Somali security forces, together with the Ethiopian and Kenyan Defence Forces, launched a new joint military operation, codenamed "Operation Juba Corridor", aimed at expelling Al-Shabaab from its last remaining strongholds in south-central Somalia. The troops seized Baardheere, Gedo region, and Diinsoor, Bay region, on 23 and 24 July, respectively. Diinsoor had been presumed to be the headquarters of Al-Shabaab since the fall of Baraawe in October 2014. AMISOM also targeted suspected Al-Shabaab positions in the Hiraan and Galguduud regions.

13. In Puntland, sporadic Al-Shabaab activities continued. On 8 May, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the assassination of a Member of Puntland's Parliament and his bodyguard in north Gaalkacyo. Following the ongoing operation in south-central Somalia, there have been reports of a northward movement of Al-Shabaab towards the Galgala Mountains. This could expose Puntland to an increased threat of attacks by Al-Shabaab. Meanwhile, on 1 August, Puntland President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali "Gaas" renewed an amnesty offer for Al-Shabaab insurgents for another month, calling on the insurgents to take advantage of the offer or face a renewed military offensive.

14. Separately, in the Sool and Sanaag regions, tensions were reported on 4 May and 15 June following a Puntland military build-up around Tukaraq, Sool Region, and armed clashes between the "Somaliland" army and a militia that supports the separatist "Khatumo" movement.

III. Support for peacebuilding and State-building efforts

A. International coordination and political support

15. Throughout the reporting period, my Special Representative, Nicholas Kay, worked closely with federal, regional and international stakeholders to support the ongoing political process. He visited Kismaayo on 18 June to encourage the Federal Government and the Interim Juba Administration to resolve their differences over the Juba Regional Assembly. He also offered strategic advice and good offices to the Federal Government on the state formation process for the central regions, encouraging all stakeholders to ensure inclusiveness and outreach towards remaining stakeholders and to resolve the dispute with Puntland. He attended the inauguration of the President of the Galmudug Interim Administration in Cadaado on 23 July and the signing on 8 August of the state formation process agreement for the Shabelle Dhexe and Hiraan regions. He also continued to facilitate coordinated approaches by the international community to the political process in Somalia, including through joint public statements and briefings.

16. International support to Somalia's peacebuilding and State-building process continued to be coordinated through the "New Deal" Compact mechanisms. Work progressed on the operationalization of the United Nations joint programmes, developed and approved through the architecture of the Compact. By the end of the reporting period, the United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund had received multi-year pledges totalling $113 million, of which $18.9 million had been disbursed.

17. On 29 and 30 July in Mogadishu, Federal President Mohamud and my Special Representative co-chaired the second Ministerial meeting of the High-level Partnership Forum, the main platform for high-level policy dialogue and strategic coordination for implementation of the Compact. This was the largest international conference held in Mogadishu for at least 25 years. Participants included representatives of the Interim South-West Administration, the Galmudug Interim Administration and Banadir; Members of the Federal Parliament; the chair of the National Independent Electoral Commission; representatives of civil society; and 32 international delegations. The Interim Juba Administration and Puntland leaders, who did not attend, subsequently endorsed the outcomes of the High-level Partnership Forum.

18. The Forum reviewed progress on the New Deal to date, set expectations for the remainder of 2015, and agreed to undertake a review of implementation by the end of 2015. Participants recognized that a one-person-one-vote election would not be possible in 2016, endorsed a set of guiding principles for an alternative "electoral process", and confirmed their expectation that the state formation process would be concluded in 2015.

19. Participants also agreed on the need to accelerate the delivery of results at the level of the citizenry, while strengthening government ownership and visibility. Specific measures were proposed which are to be finalized by September 2015. Government progress on the establishment of financial accountability and transparency was welcomed, as was the International Monetary Fund article IV consultation on Somalia that took place in Nairobi from 8 to 18 June.

B. Inclusive politics

Development of a federal system

20. Work continued to build the legal basis for emerging federal entities described above. The interim constitution of the Galmudug Interim Administration was adopted on 17 June. On 1 August, the interim constitution for "Jubaland State" was unanimously approved in Kismaayo by 300 delegates representing Juba Hoose, Juba Dhexe and Gedo regions.

21. On 6 July, the Federal Parliament approved the Government's nominations for members of the Boundaries and Federation Commission, who will be responsible for advising Parliament on the establishment of boundaries for Federal Member States, regional administrations and districts of the Federal Republic of Somalia. The commissioners elected their chairpersons on 27 July and began work on their action plan, with the support of the United Nations and other partners.

22. UNSOM and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are finalizing consultations with the Peacebuilding Support Office for the release of monies from the Peacebuilding Fund to support the Federal Government and emerging interim regional administrations to convene 10 local reconciliation conferences and three minority rights conferences in south-central Somalia.

23. During July and August, UNSOM produced a radio talk show — aired on Radio Mogadishu — on federalism and State-building, as part of a nationwide civic education campaign. The programme reached over 4 million listeners and received a record number of roughly 2,500 listener interactions. The programme is now being distributed on social media, targeting the Somali diaspora. UNSOM also produced two television talk shows on federalism and State-building, which are being broadcast on Somalia's largest television station and over social media.

24. In partnership with the Ministry of Information and Somali journalist associations, UNSOM held two training workshops for more than 75 journalists in Baidoa, Bay region, and Kismaayo to increase understanding of federalism and the peace- and State-building processes.

Constitutional review process

25. There were further delays to the review of the Provisional Federal Constitution as a result of the resignation of Asha Gelle Diriye as Chair of the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission, and continuing lack of clarity of the respective roles and responsibilities of the key national implementing institutions. However, on 27 July, the Federal Parliament approved drafting instructions by its Oversight Committee to the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission, and unanimously appointed Mohammed Dahir Afrah as the Chair of the Commission. Subsequently, the Commission, with the Oversight Committee and the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs, continued to prepare for the review process.

26. On 18 August, the UNDP Country Director and the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs signed a letter of agreement for the implementation of the United Nations Constitutional Support Project Initiation Plan, which includes providing accommodations and offices for the members of the Commission.

Preparations for elections

27. In a major milestone, on 6 July, the Federal Parliament endorsed the nine nominees of the Federal Government for the National Independent Electoral Commission. The Commission elected Halima Ismail Ibrahim as its Chair. UNSOM and UNDP, through the United Nations Integrated Electoral Support Group, established temporary offices for the Elections Commission and began work to identify and support the commissioners' needs.

28. The Department of Political Affairs conducted an election "pre-assessment" mission to Somalia from 6 to 11 July and met with Government, civil society and international stakeholders to assess prospects for conducting a constitutional referendum and national elections by September 2016. The team noted broad consensus among its interlocutors that one-person-one-vote elections in 2016 were not feasible in the light of the delays encountered in the political process as well as the remaining technical and security challenges. However, it also found that, in general, there was a strong commitment to a more legitimate and inclusive process for a change of administration at the end of the terms of the current members of Parliament. The team further noted the expectation that the United Nations would support the Federal Government in developing options for the alternative "electoral process" in 2016 and would deploy a needs assessment mission to assist the National Independent Electoral Commission in preparing for general elections at a later date.

C. Rule of law and security institutions

Security sector assistance and reform

29. International support for the Guulwade (Victory) Plan to develop the capacity of the Somali national army has been limited to date. An implementation team for the plan, comprising technical representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Somali national army, AMISOM, UNSOM, the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), the European Union Training Mission, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America was established in May and is working on the execution of the plan.

30. The National Integration Commission, inaugurated on 12 May, reached agreement with the Federal Government and the Interim Juba Administration on the numbers of personnel to be integrated into the Somali national army in Jubaland (340 from Gedo, 1,000 from Juba Dhexe and 1,540 from Juba Hoose). The Commission developed a timeline for integration of personnel in 2015 and 2016 on a regional basis. On 26 July, 1,350 personnel were officially integrated into the Somali national army; military training is ongoing. UNSOM and UNSOA continue to provide technical and logistical support to the Commission.

31. A total of 16,780 members of the Somali national army and 5,200 personnel of the Somali police force were biometrically registered in the human resources system by the end of August. The Security Sector Expenditure Task Force held its first meeting on 17 August. The Task Force is formulating recommendations on the payment of salaries and stipends, recognizing the need for sustainable arrangements for swift disbursement and the importance of a harmonized payroll system for security forces.

32. During the High-level Partnership Forum, it was agreed that greater focus was required on a national security architecture, as current security sector governance and oversight structures remain largely insufficient. Progress in this regard continues to be hampered by political challenges, in particular with regard to the State-building and constitutional review processes. UNSOM and UNDP continue to offer support through strategic assistance on the security aspects of the constitutional process.

Police

33. The Police Working Group endorsed the initial concept of the Heegan (Readiness) Plan for the development of the Somali police force, including in the recovered areas. Finalization of the plan is expected by October.

34. Following the signing in May of memorandums of understanding between the Federal Government and the Interim Juba Administration and the Interim South-West Administration, respectively, on the establishment of a regional police, UNSOM assisted with the screening and vetting of 200 prospective police officers in Baidoa. A three-month training course for those officers commenced in August. Also in August, vetting and screening of 200 officers took place in Kismaayo. UNSOM and AMISOM provided technical advice to the Federal Government and the interim regional administrations on a model for a federal structure of policing in Somalia and are facilitating a comprehensive dialogue with regional and federal stakeholders to agree on adequate structures within a federal security sector architecture.

35. UNSOM provided a two-week training course on close protection to prepare the police forces in Beledweyne, Hiraan region, to protect judicial personnel. With support from the Government of Japan, the United Nations completed the installation of a digital radio communication network that enables full coverage for police operations in Mogadishu. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) provided operational and financial support and training to the police explosive ordnance disposal units in Baidoa, Beledweyne and Mogadishu.

36. As at August, the Federal Ministry of Internal Security, with support from United Nations and AMISOM police teams, had undertaken training for 151 officers of the Somali police force to be deployed to newly recovered areas. The intent is to deploy basic civilian law enforcement capacity comprising 10 officers of the Somali police force (two commanders and eight field officers) and 35 locally recruited community security officers in each of the 13 districts recovered from Al-Shabaab.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

37. The Federal Government continued to implement its national programme for disengaging combatants. In June, the United Nations and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) signed a memorandum of understanding to implement a project to provide immediate support to the Federal Government in managing safe houses for disengaging female combatants of Al-Shabaab and their dependants. Military operations against Al-Shabaab resulted in an increase in the number of surrendering and captured combatants being placed in the national programme, which raised questions concerning the voluntary nature of the process, as well as the status of combatants captured during combat. Owing to a lack of

transitional centres and rehabilitation services, some former fighters are being accommodated in private homes or temporary shelters.

38. UNSOM continued to monitor the compliance of rehabilitation facilities with international human rights standards in line with the national programme. However, a lack of funding has reduced the capacity for monitoring. Furthermore, access to two centres was prevented by the previous management, which limited the monitoring of conditions. The present management has confirmed access for United Nations monitoring.

39. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) continued to provide community-based child reintegration services to 625 children (502 boys and 123 girls) formerly associated with armed forces or groups, including Al-Shabaab, Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a and others. UNICEF also supports other children at risk in Baidoa, Afgoye, Mogadishu and Beledweyne districts.

Maritime security

40. In July, a working group on capacity-building for Somalia's Navy and Coast Guard was launched with UNSOM support. UNSOM provided technical assistance to the Federal Government in the drafting of the Coast Guard Law and worked with the Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea of the Secretariat of the United Nations to deliver a five-day capacity-building workshop on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for Somali Government officials.

Mine action

41. On 15 June, the Somalia Explosive Management Authority assumed responsibility for coordination of all mine action activities, an important step towards full national ownership in this area. In May, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) began a community-based pilot project to address explosive hazards on the Somali-Ethiopian border, which will also provide employment opportunities.

42. In July and August, UNMAS and UNSOM trained 25 members of the Somali national army, the National Intelligence and Security Agency, the Custodial Corps and the National Security Adviser's Office in the destruction of small arms and light weapons.

Justice and corrections

43. Following its approval by the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility, the Somalia Joint Rule of Law Programme was endorsed by the Federal Government and international donors on 27 May during the inaugural Programme Steering Committee meeting. Donors contributed $60 million to the programme, in addition to bilateral support. Additional support is urgently needed for the swift implementation of the programme.

44. United Nations agencies are engaging with key justice institutions, including the Federal Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General's Office, as well as regional states and civil society partners, to prepare the implementation of the programme.

45. UNSOM assisted the Federal Ministry of Justice in assessing the priority training needs of judges, prosecutors and registrars in the interim administrations and to develop training on basic professional skills.

46. The Federal Government announced the *Onkod* ("Thunder") Plan to build a more effective Custodial Corps through legislative reform, organizational restructuring and infrastructure development. UNSOM provided advice on the plan. More than 620 members of prison staff have so far been registered in an ongoing human resources system project that will enhance financial oversight and accountability for the Custodial Corps.

D. Economic foundations

47. In June, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed its first Article IV consultation mission to Somalia in 25 years, a key milestone for Somalia's debt forgiveness process and access to concessional lending. The mission noted that current growth in gross domestic product (GDP), driven by the agriculture, construction and telecommunications sectors, would be insufficient to address poverty and gender disparities.

48. The Federal Government initiated the process for building a national development plan upon the work under Peace- and State-building Goals 4 and 5 of the New Deal Compact, laying the foundation for sustainable economic recovery and development. The plan will be in compliance with requirements of the interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which will help Somalia in its application for status as a heavily indebted poor country.

49. In May, the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility Steering Committee approved the United Nations Joint Programme on Youth Employment, which aims to catalyse growth in labour-intensive sectors and provide Somali youth with skills tailored to emerging market needs and short-term employment opportunities. Approval was also given for two World Bank initiatives aimed at supporting development of the Somali power sector, as well as the private and financial sectors, to catalyse private investment and job creation.

50. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) continued to support the livestock, agriculture and fisheries sectors at both government and local community levels. Interventions were launched in August to vaccinate 14 million livestock and treat 1.5 million more over three months. FAO is also providing financial support to over 30,000 households for the rehabilitation of productive infrastructure through a cash-for-work programme. The International Labour Organization has created employment opportunities for over 11,000 households among Somali returnees from Kenya, internally displaced persons and host communities.

E. Revenue and services

51. The World Bank continued to support the Federal Government in strengthening public financial management and financial governance. A five-year package was agreed for support to recurrent costs linked to policy measures and macro-fiscal management, as well as a package to support priority reforms of public

financial management. With financial management information systems, interim instruments and fiscal rules in place, efforts are now required to ensure their systematic implementation. Those instruments also form the basis of the United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund's new National Window, designed to channel funds directly to Government entities in support of key peacebuilding priorities.

52. Scaling up service delivery across Somalia remains a priority. An essential package of health services has so far reached over 4.2 million people. A Somali National Health Policy and other policies related to immunization and reproductive health were adopted in June. Examinations for over 7,000 children were held in June, the first centralized examination for students completing secondary school in Somalia since 1991. In the absence of a teacher payroll system, approximately 250,000 children are benefiting from teachers being paid incentives. Major funding gaps remain for provision of non-formal education opportunities for overage children.

53. The United Nations Joint Programme on Local Governance continued to have considerable success in Puntland and "Somaliland" with the adoption of decentralization policies and roadmaps, strengthened district-level administrative and financial management systems, and improved revenue generation and local government planning. Key ministries in Puntland and "Somaliland" commenced decentralized service delivery pilots, advancing the decentralization of core functions in sectors such as health, education and road development. The Joint Programme on Local Governance expanded support to the Interim Juba Administration and the Interim South-West Administration, applying lessons learned from Puntland and "Somaliland".

F. Cross-cutting issues

Stabilization

54. Efforts continued to coordinate Government, AMISOM and international efforts with respect to stabilization of districts recovered from Al-Shabaab, including the deployment of police capacity. Of the districts recovered under "Operation Eagle" and "Operation Indian Ocean", Qoryooley and Leego were briefly retaken by Al-Shabaab but an AMISOM presence was restored in both places. Activity carried out by Al-Shabaab reduced freedom of movement around Tayeeglow, with consequences for the humanitarian situation and reconciliation activities. Interim district administrators were deployed to the newly recovered Diinsoor district, while negotiations began on the interim district administration for Baardheere.

55. Activities funded by the Peacebuilding Fund Immediate Response Facility in support of the efforts of the Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs to stabilize in newly recovered areas were initiated by UNDP and UNSOM. Of the caretaker administrations being established in 13 districts, monies disbursed from the Peacebuilding Fund are providing budget support for the eight currently functioning administrations. The Federal Government has deployed Community Liaison Officers and Local Governance Assistants to those districts to strengthen the caretaker governments and to lay the foundation for establishing interim district administrations. District Peace and Stabilization Committees have been established

in seven districts to support reconciliation, dialogue and inclusion processes with citizens.

Human rights

56. Civilian casualties were a major concern during the reporting period. Violent clan conflicts and military operations by AMISOM, the Ethiopian National Defence Forces and the Somali national army resulted in 113 reported civilian casualties. These included 37 victims of violent clan fighting in the Jubaland and Hiraan regions, the latter reportedly also involving the Somali national army. A total of 22 civilians were allegedly killed by AMISOM troops during operations in Marka in Shabelle Hoose on 21 and 31 July. In early August in Hiraan, AMISOM reportedly killed a further five civilians and injured six, all of whom were passengers in a minibus. Twenty-eight civilians were reportedly killed during Ethiopian National Defence Forces/Somali national army operations in the Bakool region and 15 were killed during air strikes carried out by the Ethiopian National Defence Forces in July. UNSOM conducted an independent verification mission to Marka and has called for independent and thorough investigations into the incidents. AMISOM conducted a mission to Marka jointly with the Federal Government to meet with the affected communities and has indicted suspected perpetrators, instituted a Board of Inquiry and expressed a commitment to hold perpetrators to account. Other civilian casualties were attributed to Al-Shabaab insurgents, unidentified assailants or fighting between Somali national army/AMISOM personnel and Al-Shabaab. About 30 abductions were reported to have been carried out by suspected elements of Al-Shabaab.

57. Cases of arbitrary arrest and detention were reported. Following security operations, 185 people were arrested throughout Somalia on security-related issues, and most of them were released within 48 hours.

58. Application of the death penalty continued during the reporting period. Three executions were carried out in Mogadishu and one in Baidoa, while two death sentences were handed down in Mogadishu in June.

59. The Independent Expert on the Human Rights Situation in Somalia, Tom Nyanduga, visited Somalia from 20 to 29 May and will present his report to the Human Rights Council in September 2015.

Gender equality and women's empowerment

60. UNSOM actively lobbied and supported Somali women's organizations and the Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development to advocate for the participation of women in political processes at the federal and regional levels. In June, UNSOM facilitated separate missions by the Somali Women's Leadership Initiative and the Minister for Women to Cadaado to enable women leaders to advocate and negotiate with federal, regional and local authorities for the participation of women in the central regions state formation process. Women ultimately secured 8 of 64 seats in the newly formed Galmudug state assembly.

61. In July, the Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development, with vigorous campaigning and support by UNSOM, played a vital role in the endorsement of two women commissioners for the National Independent Electoral Commission, one of whom was selected in July as the Commission's Chair. Support

from UNSOM also enabled the Somali Women's Leadership Initiative and Men Solidarity Group for Women's Rights to participate in the Interim Juba Administration Constituent Assembly, where they advocated for constitutional provisions to protect the rights of women and girls.

Child protection

62. At least 746 cases of grave violations against children were documented in the reporting period. Reported incidents affected 689 children, comprising 567 boys and 122 girls, and mostly implicated elements of Al-Shabaab and the Somali national army. In the current reporting period, only one case of defection from Al-Shabaab by a child was recorded.

63. On 4 June, UNSOM held an orientation workshop to promote awareness in the Somali national army of issues faced by children in armed conflict and on the mainstreaming of child protection into the policies and activities of the Somali national army. On 8 June, the United Nations supported the Child Protection Unit of the Somali national army to inspect troops gathered for militia integration in Kismaayo, resulting in 36 children being screened out. From 9 to 13 June, the United Nations Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting supported members of the Child Protection Unit to travel to Uganda to learn from the successful implementation of its plan to stop recruitment and use of children in the Uganda People's Defence Force.

Prevention of sexual violence

64. During the reporting period, UNSOM provided support to the Somali police force to ensure the integration of women's protection and conflict-related sexual violence concerns into the Heegan Plan. Efforts are also under way to incorporate conflict-related and sexual violence protection measures into the militia integration process of the Somali national army. UNSOM continued its efforts to sensitize civilian and military judicial system stakeholders to due process in cases of sexual violence. Through the support of the United Nations Team of Experts on Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict, four prosecutors and judges received training at the Regional Training Facility on Prevention and Suppression of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Great Lakes Region, held in Kampala from 10 to 13 August.

65. UNSOM also conducted training of trainers in sexual and gender-based violence and basic investigation skills in cooperation with AMISOM. Those trainers will be assigned to provide basic and ongoing training to new and experienced investigators.

66. On 18 August, my Special Representative briefed senior officers of the United Nations Guard Unit on the zero tolerance policy of the United Nations towards sexual exploitation and abuse and on my special measures for protection against such exploitation and abuse.

IV. Humanitarian situation

67. The humanitarian situation in Somalia remains fragile. Inter-agency contingency planning is under way for up to 900,000 people in Somalia who could

be affected by possible major flooding in the Shabelle and Juba areas owing to the El Niño phenomenon in 2015. The number of Somalis in need of food assistance is predicted to increase through December, primarily in Shabelle Dhexe, owing to flooding, and in the agropastoral areas of Awdal, Hiraan and Juba Dhexe owing to erratic *Gu* rainfall from April to June.

68. Food security conditions are expected to improve in livestock-dependent livelihood zones owing to an improvement in livestock herd size and favourable prices. However, there continues to be a high residual level of acute malnutrition, with 731,000 Somalis who are unable to meet their basic food needs and a further 2.3 million people who are at risk. An estimated 12 per cent of children under five years of age (202,600) are acutely malnourished, including 38,200 who are severely malnourished and face a high risk of mortality.

69. Over 1.1 million Somalis remain in protracted displacement, most of whom are food insecure. The joint Somali national army-AMISOM operations in the Juba Corridor have triggered additional displacements. Forced evictions continue to cause protection concerns.

70. The situation in Yemen has added additional stress to the already stretched humanitarian response system. As at 19 July, more than 28,000 people had arrived in Somalia from Yemen, more than 90 per cent of whom are Somalis. Humanitarian organizations established reception centres for returnees at the ports of Boosaaso in Puntland and Berbera in Somaliland, jointly with the local authorities.

71. The volatile security situation continues to make the delivery of humanitarian assistance extremely dangerous. In the first six months of 2015, over 70 incidents involving humanitarian organizations were reported, accounting for nine deaths and five abductions. Despite the challenges, humanitarian organizations continue to use innovative ways to deliver humanitarian assistance, including the use of community networks, local organizations, private transport companies and air cargo.

72. In the first six months of 2015, an estimated 658,000 Somalis were assisted through various interventions, countrywide acute malnutrition levels were lowered from 14.9 to 12 per cent, and the number of people unable to meet their minimum food needs reduced to 731,000 from over 1 million. The one-year mark since the last reported case of polio in Somalia was crossed on 11 August.

73. UNICEF provided cash assistance to 61,200 vulnerable people through the end of the main pastoral lean season in June, and will continue to provide support to 39,000 individuals through September. Nutrition cluster partners reached 23,877 acutely malnourished children and 2,638 malnourished pregnant and lactating women with lifesaving treatment services. Since May 2015, water, sanitation and hygiene cluster partners have provided support to 185,000 people with access to safe water, 25,000 people gained access to sanitation facilities, and 270,000 people received hygiene kits and/or materials designed to promote hygiene.

74. Most government institutions continue to lack basic capacities to implement their mandates, including human resources, guiding policies and infrastructure. World Bank and UNDP projects to support capacity development in core government functions have been approved.

75. Inter-agency humanitarian assessment missions were undertaken to identify urgent needs in newly recovered Baardheere and Diinsoor. More than 14 humanitarian

organizations are currently active in the two towns and more are expected to begin work as the situation improves.

V. Targeted sanctions

76. During the informal consultations of the Security Council Committee on Somalia and Eritrea on 1 May, the Committee was briefed on the implementation of the charcoal ban by the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, the Combined Maritime Forces and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The Committee Chair briefed the Security Council on 16 July. In August, the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group commenced the drafting of its final report, which the Committee is scheduled to consider on 9 October.

VI. Implementation of resolutions 2124 (2013), 2182 (2014) and 2232 (2015)

Support to AMISOM and the Somali national army

77. By its resolution 2232 (2015), the Security Council endorsed the recommendations of the Joint African Union-United Nations Review Mission that were outlined in my letter of 2 July to the President of the Council. From 17 to 25 August, AMISOM convened a meeting in Nairobi to revise its concept of operations in consultation with the United Nations and relevant partners. The draft revised concept of operations will be reviewed by the African Union Commission before being approved by the African Union Peace and Security Council.

78. Field visits for the UNSOA strategic review were conducted from 30 July to 8 August in Addis Ababa, Somalia and Nairobi and included consultations with the Federal Government, AMISOM, the African Union, Member States, UNSOM and other UNSOA clients. The review seeks to provide options for UNSOA to remain fit for purpose in response to the strategic objectives of the United Nations in Somalia. The final report of the strategic review will be submitted by 30 September, in accordance with resolution 2232 (2015).

79. UNSOA continued to provide logistics support to AMISOM across all sectors in south-central Somalia, with an increased burden on its air assets owing to insecurity along and inaccessibility of main supply routes. The force enabling units envisaged in resolution 2124 (2013) have not yet been deployed. The provision of potable water to the sectors continued to be a challenge, and UNSOA is expediting a borehole drilling programme and the distribution of water treatment plants. Following the attack on 26 July at the Jazeera Palace Hotel, there is an urgent need for additional accommodation facilities at Mogadishu International Airport.

80. From 10 July to 6 August, UNSOA supported the rotation of Ethiopian, Burundian and Ugandan troops, as well as a Ugandan formed police unit of 140 personnel. UNSOA also provided support to the rotation of the Ugandan United Nations Guard Unit, consisting of 410 troops, and the deployment of an additional 120 troops from Uganda to the Guard Unit, bringing the force strength to 530, as indicated in my letter of 6 April to the President of the Security Council (S/2015/234).

81. Discussions among the African Union, the United Nations and the Government of Uganda on the letter of assist for the deployment of Ugandan military helicopters are at an advanced stage. UNSOA conducted predeployment and in-mission training for 713 AMISOM personnel during the reporting period, including training for the Uganda aviation unit, in preparation for the deployment of six Ugandan helicopters. UNSOA also conducted medical evacuation, repatriation and redeployment of 248 AMISOM personnel, and issued 3,000 individual first aid kits to troops of the Somali national army.

82. While the previously trained and registered 9,157 Somali national army troops continued to benefit from UNSOA logistics support, an additional 1,350 troops received mandatory human rights training in Kismaayo, bringing to 10,507 the total number of troops of the Somali national army who are eligible for UNSOA support. Additional Somali national army troops are expected to undergo human rights training in Dhobley and Ceelwaaq in September 2015.

83. There were no further contributions to the Trust Fund in support of AMISOM and the Somali national army during the reporting period. UNSOA has spent $14.65 million from the Trust Fund in support of the Somali national army in joint operations with AMISOM, pursuant to resolution 2124 (2013). As of 24 August, the balance in the AMISOM Trust Fund stood at $2.8 million, while the Somali national army Trust Fund is nearing depletion. The United States Government has signalled its intention to make a contribution of $15 million to the Somali national army Trust Fund.

84. As part of the UNSOA logistics support package, UNMAS continued to train, mentor and equip 13 AMISOM teams in improvised explosive device countermeasures and explosive ordnance disposal teams. During the reporting period, AMISOM responded to 92 emergency incidents involving improvised explosive devices and other explosive hazards. Mentors provided non-lethal combat engineering technical advice to the Force Enabling Unit resulting in the safe delivery of 2,452,165 kgs of cargo to the United Nations, the Federal Government and AMISOM/Somali national army.

85. UNMAS began to embed staff into AMISOM Force Headquarters, Sector Headquarters, and UNSOA, enabling it to provide better tactical advice and mapping on mobility and the threat of improvised explosive devices. UNMAS provided data, analysis and non-lethal technical advice to AMISOM to support mobility and resupply on main supply routes.

Human rights due diligence policy

86. As part of the mitigating measures of the policy, UNSOM delivered training on human rights and international humanitarian law to 318 officers of the Somali national army and a "training of trainers" workshop on human rights and international humanitarian law for 25 selected AMISOM trainers. The trainers have trained 1,600 newly integrated security forces in Jubaland. A three-day human rights training for 20 officers of the Criminal Investigation Department of the Somali police force was also delivered.

87. In June 2015, the Joint AMISOM/United Nations Working Group on the human rights due diligence policy adopted a report which maps existing measures and mechanisms to ensure compliance with the policy by AMISOM and the Somali

national army. The report identified gaps and further measures to improve implementation of the policy, including a standing agenda item to review allegations of human rights violations attributed to AMISOM. The Working Group met on 6 August following allegations against AMISOM in relation to its operations in July in Marka. On 20 August, the United Nations internal task force on the human rights due diligence policy met to identify further mitigation measures to prevent human rights violations by AMISOM troops and recommend corrective action.

VII. United Nations presence in Somalia

A. Expansion of the presence of the United Nations

88. During the reporting period, the number of international staff averaged 408 across Somalia, while the number of national staff averaged 1,024. The international staff average for Mogadishu was 275. There was a slight scaling back in presence in Puntland after the attack on the United Nations vehicle in Garoowe on 20 April.

B. Integration

89. The Joint Planning Unit of UNISOM and the Resident Coordinator's Office jointly developed a tool to monitor progress in the implementation of the Integrated Strategic Framework for Somalia. The first report was presented to the Senior Management Group on 2 June. Subsequent reports will be submitted for discussion every 120 days and will focus on identifying common challenges and providing recommendations that require action by the Senior Management Group.

90. Discussions are ongoing between UNSOM and the United Nations country team regarding joint deployments in the regions in order to maximize resources, based on integrated analysis and planning. UNSOM and the country team have developed regional strategic plans to guide programme delivery and assist regional authorities in their own planning efforts. Meanwhile, the United Nations in Somalia has designed a comprehensive risk management strategy with partners for all three trust funds under the New Deal Compact.

C. Staff safety and security

91. Following revised security risk assessments in Puntland and Somaliland, United Nations agencies worked hard to ensure continued programme delivery and access to local counterparts, while taking steps to address the increased security requirements of the minimum operating security standards.

92. In June, UNSOM and the United Nations country team conducted an exercise to revise the programme criticality framework for Somalia. The findings of the exercise were incorporated into security risk assessments and will inform ongoing deployment planning.

93. Amendments to the status-of-mission agreement covering the operation of the United Nations Guard Unit, and a memorandum of understanding on coordinating the operations of the Unit with those of the Somali security forces, were agreed between the United Nations and the Federal Government on 23 May.

94. All Department of Safety and Security core international staff posts were filled by mid-August 2015, while extra capacity was added to Mogadishu, Baidoa and Doolow. Extrabudgetary funding has been secured to the end of 2015 for the Medical Emergency Response Teams project.

VIII. Observations

95. Much progress has been achieved through the commitment of Somali leaders and ordinary Somalis, supported by the international community in a show of unity that is almost unparalleled. The administration of the first centralized examination since 1991 — the beginning of the civil war in Somalia — to some 7,000 secondary school students is a concrete example of a beginning of normalization, and hope, which are much needed in Somalia. The beginnings of a resurgence in the economic and social life of Mogadishu and other cities nationwide are a clear testimony of the commitment of the Somalis to rebuilding their society. Yet, no one should be complacent. Much more needs to be done to consolidate the gains and tackle the remaining challenges.

96. Ongoing joint military operations by the Somali national army and AMISOM have continued to create more territorial space for the Government to exercise its authority. I pay tribute to AMISOM and the Somali national army forces, who continue to make sacrifices, showing perseverance despite many challenges. Recent incidents, including the attack in Leego on 26 June and the Jazeera Palace Hotel suicide bombing on 26 July, are constant reminders of the danger we continue to face in Somalia.

97. I welcome the determination of both the Federal Government and the international community not to be daunted by the cowardly terrorist attacks. The people of Somalia continue to show tremendous resilience in the face of an enemy that does not respect human life, even during the holy month of Ramadan. At the same time, military operations alone will not address the threat of terrorism. I encourage Member States to consider what more can be done to ensure a truly comprehensive approach to Al-Shabaab, including supporting the emergence of a state that offers Somalis political inclusion, security, respect for human rights and economic opportunity.

98. Recent progress in the state formation process is commendable. I welcome the successful completion of the formation of the Galmudug Interim Administration in the central regions and highlight the leadership role played by the Federal Government in guiding the process. I urge the Federal Government and the Galmudug Interim Administration to continue reaching out to all groups in the region to further deepen inclusivity. As the Interim Juba Administration and the Interim South-West Administration continue to consolidate their administrations, I call upon the Federal Government to play a similarly enabling role. The launching of the process of forming an interim administration for Hiraan and Shabelle Dhexe regions is also encouraging. Achieving the establishment of functional federal member states is a critical building block for the conclusion of other political processes. I urge the Federal Government and the stakeholders to work closely in a cohesive and inclusive process towards that end.

99. The High-level Partnership Forum marked a significant political moment. Necessary actions were agreed upon to ensure that the "electoral process" in 2016 is

Somali-owned, more inclusive and representative than in 2012, and more orderly. Following the High-level Partnership Forum, the Federal Government finalized its action plan for the 2016 "electoral process" on 15 August after consulting the Parliament and interim regional administrations. Discussions are under way on how to move the plan forward, with the technical and financial support of the international community. I am pleased to note this agreement and urge all stakeholders to work expeditiously to implement the action plan.

100. In this context, the motion to impeach the President, introduced in the Parliament on 12 August, raises concerns about the stability of the political process. I add my voice to the joint statement issued by Somalia's international partners on 18 August on this issue and appeal to all the Somali stakeholders to remain focused on the urgent and pending priorities facing the country, including preparation for the 2016 "electoral process", completion of the state formation process and the fight against Al-Shabaab.

101. Continuing delays in the implementation of several other elements of the Vision 2016 inclusive politics framework remain problematic. In particular, the constitutional review process is a key area in which substantial progress needs to be made, especially since the key national implementing institutions are now in place. As part of this process, there is an urgent need to agree on a national security sector architecture with clearly defined roles and responsibilities of all security institutions in a federal Somalia. This should also provide a framework in which the accelerating militia integration can take place. This must include effective oversight and accountability mechanisms to prevent and address human rights violations.

102. I welcome the important commitments made by the Federal Government and the international community regarding the security sector during the High-level Partnership Forum. I urge all partners to commit to mobilizing resources for the implementation of the Guulwade Plan and the Heegan Plan upon its completion, as well as the work of the National Integration Commission. Current issues with the non-payment of salaries to the national security forces could have serious implications. I urge the Government and the international community to address the situation without delay and look forward to the work of the Security Sector Expenditure Task Force on addressing the issue of payments of salaries and stipends so that harmonized, sustainable and transparent national payroll and stipend systems can be developed.

103. The support of UNSOA to the Somali national army is playing an important role in enhancing the operational capacity of the national forces, especially at the present time when they, together with AMISOM, have launched an offensive to liberate territory from Al-Shabaab. I, once again, urge Member States to contribute generously to the Trust Fund to enable UNSOA to provide uninterrupted support to the Somali national army as authorized by the Council.

104. I remain concerned about the continuing practice of the death penalty in Somalia and call for an urgent moratorium to be implemented. I condemn the abuses committed by Al-Shabaab, in particular its frequent executions of civilians. I am deeply worried and concerned about reports of killings of civilians by the Somali security forces and AMISOM forces. I welcome recent actions by AMISOM and call upon the national authorities and AMISOM, where relevant, to continue investigating allegations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the context of military operations and to hold the perpetrators

accountable. I similarly urge accountability for violations and abuses attributable to foreign forces operating outside the AMISOM umbrella. The implementation of the human rights due diligence policy in Somalia is paramount to United Nations efforts in the country.

105. As outlined in my letter of 2 July to the Security Council and endorsed in resolution 2232 (2015), substantial contributions to the development and sustainment of the Somali police force are required. These must include short-term initiatives to jump-start the establishment of a police force in the regions, along with a recommended gradual reconfiguration of AMISOM towards more police personnel where appropriate. In collaboration with AMISOM, United Nations entities are developing detailed options for the implementation and delivery of a non-lethal support package for the Somali police force, which will be presented to the Council in September, as requested in its resolution 2232 (2015).

106. I remain extremely concerned at the fragile humanitarian situation in Somalia, which is being compounded by the crisis in Yemen, and at the increased rate of forced evictions and displacement prompted by the military offensive. Over 3 million people remain in need of humanitarian assistance. The potential humanitarian impact of El Niño is also of serious concern. I urge all parties to facilitate timely, unhindered and safe access for humanitarian actors and to find durable solutions for the 1.1 million Somalis who are internally displaced. I reiterate my appeal to donors to increase support to the $863 million humanitarian appeal, which is aimed at addressing the needs of over 2.8 million Somalis.

107. I am disappointed that in "Somaliland", the Supreme Court has ruled in favour of the *Guurti* to postpone presidential and parliamentary elections until March 2017. The decision was made despite international appeals against the postponement and risks jeopardizing the gains that the region has made in its democratization effort.

108. Numerous challenges notwithstanding, in recent months, Somalia has made some progress in women's political participation and leadership at the national and local levels. While much remains to be achieved, the inclusion and engagement of women in strategic positions, such as in the Interim Juba Administration and Galmudug state assemblies, the National Independent Electoral Commission and Federal and regional cabinets, are indications of slow but steady progress. Traditional elders and political leaders have a responsibility to help to redress the gender imbalance.

109. As I have stated in the past, the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for ushering in lasting peace, stability and national development in their country. Somalia has suffered long enough from painful past years of anarchy and destruction. The Somali leadership and representatives must live up to their responsibility of showing the political commitment and unity required to guide the process to a satisfactory conclusion in 2016. The international community stands ready to continue supporting Somalia.

110. I pay tribute to my Special Representative, Nicholas Kay, his deputies and the staff members of UNSOM, UNSOA and the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and other international and regional organizations in Somalia for their continued hard work under challenging conditions. I also thank the African Union, AMISOM, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the European Union and other development partners for their sustained support to the search for durable peace in Somalia. We must continue to strengthen our partnership in the quest for lasting peace and stability.



Map No. 3690 Rev. 10.2 UNITED NATIONS
May 2014

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

United Nations A/ES-10/689–S/2015/703

General Assembly
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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 11 September 2015 from the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

Yesterday, 10 September 2015, the General Assembly overwhelmingly voted in favour of the resolution on raising the flags of non-member observer States at the United Nations, namely, the flags of the State of Palestine and the Holy See. It is without a doubt that yesterday's historic vote reaffirms the legitimacy of the national aspirations of the Palestinian people, their existence among the nations of the world and their right to self-determination in their own independent State of Palestine, with East Jerusalem as its capital. We realize that raising our flag will end neither the occupation nor the cruel subjugation of the Palestinian people, but it will help restore some hope to the Palestinian people and their leadership as they continue on the peaceful, non-violent, political and legal path to fulfilling their rights. This is ever so important, especially given the deteriorating situation on the ground in the Occupied State of Palestine, including East Jerusalem, as a result of Israel's illegal actions and practices.

In this regard, it is with great sadness that we must include in our letter today the tragic news that Riham Dawabsha, 27 years of age, has become the third member of her family who has succumbed to her wounds and died as a result of the heinous terrorist arson attack that engulfed her home in the West Bank town of Duma in flames on 31 July. Riham, the mother of 18-month-old Ali, who was burned alive, and wife of Saad, who died of his wounds on 8 August, sustained third-degree burns on 90 per cent of her body. She fought for her life in a hospital bed for five weeks until her condition took a turn for the worse. Riham is survived by her son, Ahmad, 4 years of age, the only living member of the family, who lies in a hospital bed suffering from massive burns to his small body. Ahmad, like so many Palestinian children, is now an orphan without a mother, father or siblings — a fate that, sadly, many more Palestinian children will suffer if Israeli settler terrorists are not held accountable for their crimes.

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We reiterate our condemnation of this heinous terrorist arson attack and continue to hold the Government of Israel responsible for the deaths of these innocent civilians as well as the culture of hate and violence it continues to foster through the imposition of its endless, illegal policies and practices, which include the transfer of illegal settlers to illegal settlements throughout the Occupied State of Palestine, including East Jerusalem. Up until today, no arrests have been made in the terrorist arson attack, even though the Israeli Government has publicly confirmed that the perpetrators have been identified. The lack of accountability granted by the occupying Power to Israeli settlers who carry out terrorist attacks will only further incite the culture of violence and hatred that has already been fomented against Palestinian civilians and their properties, resulting in undeterred settler violence and the continued killing and injuring of Palestinian civilians, including children.

Besides the impunity that Israeli settlers enjoy as a result of the Israeli occupying forces, the Palestinian people also continue to be harmed and killed by Israeli occupying forces. Such excessive and disproportionate use of force by the Israeli occupying forces can clearly be witnessed in Nabi Saleh, a West Bank village in which, every Friday, a non-violent demonstration is coordinated to protest against the stealing of land and water resources by the neighbouring illegal Israeli settlement of "Halamish". During a demonstration held on 28 August 2015, the world witnessed the brute force by Israeli occupying forces against children when a masked Israeli soldier placed an already injured Mohammed Basim Tamimi, 12 years of age, in a headlock with an assault rifle to his cheek. The terrified Mohammed was freed only as a result of the efforts of Palestinian women and girls who were relatives of Mohammed, who struggled with the Israeli soldier to free the young boy. Even though not all instances of it are photographed and recorded on video for the world to see, this sort of abuse and violence against Palestinian children is perpetuated, regularly and systematically, as part of a policy by Israel, the occupying Power. Such is the case in the occupied Gaza Strip, where, just last week, the child of a fisherman was shot and injured by Israeli occupying forces near the shores of Beit Lahiya in the northern Gaza Strip. The young child who was shot, Bilal Abu Amro, is only 11 years old. Regrettably, this is not the first incident, as Palestinian fishermen in the Gaza Strip continue to be targeted and attacked by Israeli occupying forces on a regular basis, further infringing on their livelihoods and threatening the economic survival of their families.

As the violations against Palestinian children continue to multiply, we continue to insist again that the Israeli Government, the Israeli occupying forces and Israeli settler militias belong on the list of grave violators of child rights in the context of the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict, and we will not relent in calling for such listing in the face of ongoing violations and crimes against our innocent and defenceless children.

Moreover, in other parts of Occupied Palestine where peaceful demonstrations take place on a regular basis, Israeli occupying forces display the same type of contempt for Palestinian lives. This is definitely the case in the Palestinian town of Bait Jala, where, every Sunday after mass, Palestinian Christians, led by a revered church leader, Patriarch Michel Sabbah, peacefully protest against Israel's expansionist Wall, which cuts deep into Palestinian land. This past Sunday, 6 September, images of medics helping a nun injured by Israeli tear gas clearly

demonstrated that Israeli occupying forces target Palestinian civilians regardless of whether they are men, women, children, elderly, disabled or Muslim or Christian.

Indisputably, the above-mentioned violations are in grave breach of international humanitarian law, as well as international criminal law as articulated in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and in contempt of the will of the international community. We call again upon the international community, particularly the Security Council, to act immediately to end Israel's impunity and resolve this conflict, which clearly constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Moreover, since Israel, the occupying Power, has so evidently forfeited its responsibility under international humanitarian law to protect the people under its occupation, we continue to call upon the international community to provide international protection to the Palestinian civilian population in the Occupied State of Palestine, including East Jerusalem. The international community cannot continue to remain paralysed in resolving this issue, as that will only contribute to the spreading of more conflict and extremism in our region and undermine faith in the rule of law and the international system and in the prospects for peace.

The present letter is in follow-up to our 551 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which constitutes the State of Palestine. Those letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 18 August 2015 (A/ES-10/688-S/2015/649), constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed against the Palestinian people by Israel, the occupying Power, for which it must be held accountable and the perpetrators brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer
of the State of Palestine to the United Nations

United Nations A/69/1028–S/2015/704

General Assembly
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General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Items 33 and 38

Security Council
Seventieth year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 11 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

It is with great concern that I am writing to draw your attention to the fact that on 1 September 2015, the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia, from their positions in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, opened fire purposefully targeting a wedding ceremony in Gapanly village of the Terter district. Three civilians, including one child, were wounded.

Direct, deliberate targeting of civilians is a blatant case of violation of international humanitarian law by Armenia and constitutes a war crime under international criminal law.

Unfortunately, it is not a new phenomenon. During the ongoing aggression against the Republic of Azerbaijan, Armenia has committed numerous crimes against civilians: indiscriminate attacks against and killing of civilians, hostage-taking and detention, inhuman treatment and execution of war prisoners and hostages and ethnic cleansing of the occupied territories. The most heinous of them is the massacre of the civilian population of the town of Khojaly, which resulted in the death of hundreds, including children, women and the elderly.

These crimes were not an isolated or sporadic act, but were part of Armenia's deliberate, widespread and systematic policy and practice of atrocities, at the core of which are odious ideas of racial superiority, ethnic differentiation, hatred and territorial expansionism.

The documents adopted by international organizations explicitly refer to the crimes committed by Armenia as a blatant breach of international humanitarian law. Yet, in 1993, in its resolution 853 (1993), the Security Council particularly condemned attacks on civilians and bombardments of inhabited areas and expressed

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its grave concern at the displacement of large numbers of civilians in the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The permanent violation of the ceasefire regime and subjection of the civilian population to armed attacks clearly prove that Armenia is not interested in a peaceful settlement of the conflict and that its true intention is to continue the occupation of the territories of Azerbaijan and to maintain the current status quo by all means.

While the protection of civilians is high on the agenda of the Security Council and the international community strives to enhance protection and minimize casualties, Armenia, in full breach of its international legal obligations, carries on with its policy of targeted killing and maiming of the civilian population. It must be stopped.

The Security Council should take decisive actions to put an end to Armenia's continued aggression against the Republic of Azerbaijan and the impunity that it has enjoyed for decades.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 33 and 38, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2015/705

Security Council

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Note by the President of the Security Council

At its 6335th meeting, held on 9 June 2010 in connection with the item entitled "Non-proliferation", the Security Council adopted resolution 1929 (2010).

In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to communicate to the Council all his reports on the application of safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Accordingly, the President circulates herewith the report of the Director General dated 27 August 2015 (see annex).

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Annex

Letter dated 27 August 2015 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to enclose herewith the report requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1929 (2010), which I have submitted today to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and the enclosed report to the attention of the members of the Council.

(*Signed*) Yukiya **Amano**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report by the Director General

Main Developments

- On 2 July 2015, the Director General held meetings with the President of Iran, HE Mr Hassan Rouhani, and the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, HE Mr Ali Shamkhani, to advance work towards the resolution of all outstanding issues.
- On 14 July 2015, the Director General and the Vice-President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, HE Mr Ali Akbar Salehi, signed a 'Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme' (Road-map), as set out in the annex to the Director General's report of November 2011.
- On 14 July 2015, the E3/EU+3 and Iran agreed on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
- On 20 July 2015, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2231, in which, inter alia, it "requests the Director General of the IAEA to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA".
- On 15 August 2015, as agreed in the Road-map, Iran provided to the Agency its explanations in writing and related documents, on past and present outstanding issues.
- On 25 August 2015, the Board of Governors, inter alia, authorized the Director General to implement the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA, subject to the availability of funds and consistent with the Agency's standard safeguards practices.
- The Agency has continued to undertake monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear-related measures set out in the Joint Plan of Action (JPA).

A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement[1] and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions[2] in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran). It contains information, inter alia, regarding the 'Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation' (the Framework for Cooperation) and the 'Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme' (Road-map); the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), as further extended; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA);[3] and United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).

2. The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions[4] are binding on Iran.[5] The relevant provisions of the six Security Council resolutions[6] were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and are mandatory, in accordance with the terms of those resolutions.[7,8]

3. This report addresses developments since the Director General's previous report (GOV/2015/34),[9] as well as issues of longer standing.

B. Recent Developments

B.1. Clarification of Unresolved Issues

4. The Board of Governors, in its resolution of November 2011 (GOV/2011/69), stressed that it was essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue aimed at the urgent resolution of all outstanding substantive issues for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding those issues, including access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Iran. In its resolution of September 2012 (GOV/2012/50), the Board of Governors decided that Iranian cooperation with Agency requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues was essential and urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

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[1] The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.

[2] This refers to six United Nations Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010: 1696 (2006); 1737 (2006); 1747 (2007); 1803 (2008); 1835 (2008); and 1929 (2010).

[3] The text of the JCPOA was communicated to the Director General by the Permanent Representatives to the IAEA of the E3+3 countries and Iran in a letter dated 24 July 2015 (INFCIRC/887).

[4] Between September 2003 and September 2012, the Board of Governors adopted 12 resolutions in connection with the implementation of safeguards in Iran (see GOV/2013/56, footnote 2).

[5] Security Council resolution 1929 (2010).

[6] Those listed in footnote 2.

[7] Part I.A of the Agency's Relationship Agreement with the United Nations (INFCIRC/11).

[8] Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

[9] The Director General continues to provide the Board of Governors with monthly updates on Iran's implementation of "voluntary measures" undertaken in relation to the JPA, the most recent of which was provided in GOV/INF/2015/15.

5. As previously reported, on 11 November 2013, the Agency and Iran signed a 'Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation' (GOV/INF/2013/14). In the Framework for Cooperation, the Agency and Iran agreed to cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the Agency to resolve all present and past issues, and to proceed with such activities in a step by step manner. The practical measures agreed in relation to the Framework for Cooperation between November 2013 and May 2014 are listed in Annex I. Since the Director General's previous report, no further meetings have been held in respect of these practical measures.

6. On 2 July 2015, the Director General held meetings in Tehran with the President of Iran, HE Mr Hassan Rouhani, and the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, HE Mr Ali Shamkhani, to advance work towards the resolution of all outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme, including clarification of possible military dimensions.

7. On 14 July 2015, the Director General and the Vice-President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, HE Mr Ali Akbar Salehi, signed in Vienna a 'Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme' (Road-map), as set out in the annex to the Director General's report of November 2011 (GOV/2011/65).[10] The Road-map identifies the necessary activities to be undertaken under the Framework for Cooperation, in order to accelerate and strengthen cooperation and dialogue between the Agency and Iran aimed at the resolution, by the end of 2015, of all past and present outstanding issues that have not already been resolved by the Agency and Iran. (The Road-map is reproduced in Annex II.)

8. As agreed in the Road-map, on 15 August 2015, Iran provided to the Agency its explanations in writing and related documents, on past and present outstanding issues. The Agency is reviewing this information.

B.2. Joint Plan of Action

9. As previously reported, on 24 November 2013, a Joint Plan of Action (JPA) was agreed between China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (E3+3) and Iran.[11] The JPA took effect on 20 January 2014, initially for a period of six months. As requested by the E3+3 and Iran, and endorsed by the Board of Governors (subject to the availability of funds), the Agency undertook the necessary nuclear related monitoring and verification activities in relation to the JPA, involving activities additional to those already being carried out pursuant to Iran's Safeguards Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and Security Council.[12] On 24 July 2014, the JPA was extended until 24 November 2014 when it was further extended until 30 June 2015. On 30 June 2015, the E3+3 and Iran requested the Agency, on behalf of the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to continue to undertake the necessary nuclear related

[10] GOV/INF/2015/14.

[11] The text of the JPA was communicated to the Director General by the High Representative of the European Union (EU), on behalf of the E3+3 (INFCIRC/855), and by the Resident Representative of Iran to the IAEA, on behalf of Iran (INFCIRC/856).

[12] See footnote 2.

monitoring and verification activities in Iran under the JPA "until further communication".[13]

10. Since the Director General's previous report, the Agency has continued to undertake the nuclear related monitoring and verification activities under the JPA. These JPA-related activities have been funded by voluntary contributions already provided by Member States. The Secretariat estimates that these funds will be exhausted by the end of September 2015 and has indicated that additional voluntary contributions are necessary to sustain the funding of the Agency's JPA-related activities.[14,15]

B.3. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

11. On 14 July 2015, the E3/EU+3 and Iran agreed on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA states, inter alia, that it "builds on" the implementation of the JPA and that the "full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme".[16] The Director General welcomed the agreement, stating that it would "facilitate the IAEA's further verification work in Iran".[17] He informed IAEA Member States that the Agency would be asked to "monitor and verify the nuclear-related measures set out in the agreement" and that he would then report to and consult the Board of Governors on this request and how to secure the necessary financial resources for the Agency.

B.4. Security Council Resolution 2231

12. On 20 July 2015, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015),[18] in which, inter alia, it requested the Director General to "undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA";[19] reaffirmed that Iran "shall cooperate fully as the IAEA requests to be able to resolve all outstanding issues, as

[13] GOV/INF/2015/11, Attachment.

[14] It is expected that the Agency will continue conducting JPA-related activities until "Implementation Day", as defined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, para. 34 (iii).

[15] For information on the additional resources required by the Agency in relation to the further extension of the JPA, as well as in relation to the requests of the Security Council contained in resolution 2231, see 'Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)' (GOV/2015/53 and Corr.1), 14 August 2015.

[16] JCPOA, Preamble and General Provisions, para. ii.

[17] Note by the Secretariat, 2015/Note 55, 14 July 2015.

[18] Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) makes provision for the termination of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) in accordance with its terms. Upon termination of the above referenced Security Council resolutions, the Board of Governors may wish to consider parallel action in regard to its decision (see GOV/2007/7 and GOV/OR.1181, paras. 40 and 41) and consequential decisions on technical cooperation provided to Iran, which were taken through the Agency's Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee (based on GOV/2008/47/Add.3, GOV/2009/65, GOV/2011/58/Add.3 and GOV/2013/49/Add.3).

[19] The actions requested of the Director General by the Security Council as contained in resolution 2231 are set out in GOV/2015/53 and Corr.1, para. 8.

identified in IAEA reports";[20] and requested that the Agency and the Joint Commission[21] "consult and exchange information, where appropriate, as specified in the JCPOA".[22]

B.5. Board of Governors Meeting of 25 August 2015

13. On 25 August 2015, the Board of Governors took note of the Director General's report on 'Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)' (GOV/2015/53 and Corr.1); authorized the Director General to implement the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA, and report accordingly, for the full duration of those commitments in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), subject to the availability of funds[23] and consistent with the Agency's standard safeguards practices; and authorized the Agency to consult and exchange information with the Joint Commission, as set out in that report.[24] In his opening remarks to the Board of Governors, the Director General indicated that as stated in the JCPOA, all provisions under the agreement are a "special arrangement and do not set a precedent".

C. Facilities Declared under Iran's Safeguards Agreement

14. Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 18 nuclear facilities and nine locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs)[25] (Annex III). Notwithstanding that certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council,[26] as indicated below, the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at these facilities and LOFs.

D. Enrichment Related Activities

15. Iran is conducting enrichment related activities in the declared facilities referred to below, contrary to the requirement of relevant resolutions of the Board of

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[20] Security Council resolution 2231, para. 3.

[21] The JCPOA establishes a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the E3/EU+3 and Iran (Annex IV of the JCPOA).

[22] Security Council resolution 2231, para. 19.

[23] A number of Member States indicated that they would make extrabudgetary funds available.

[24] The Board of Governors also approved modifications to 'The Agency's Programme and Budget 2016-2017 (GC(59)/2) as proposed in paragraph 3 of Section B of GOV/2015/54; and requested the Secretariat to take the necessary actions on the elements contained in Section B of GOV/2015/54 and to modify document GC(59)/2 as necessary to reflect the Board's decision, for submission to the General Conference.

[25] All of the LOFs are situated within hospitals.

[26] Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

Governors and Security Council[27] to suspend all such activities. However, since 20 January 2014, Iran has not produced UF_6 enriched above 5% U-235 and all of its stock of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235[28] has been further processed through downblending or conversion into uranium oxide (see Annex IV). All of the enrichment related activities at Iran's declared facilities are under Agency safeguards, and all of the nuclear material, installed cascades, and feed and withdrawal stations at those facilities are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.[29]

16. Iran has stated that the purpose of enriching UF_6 up to 5% U-235 is the production of fuel for its nuclear facilities.[30] Since Iran began enriching uranium at its declared facilities, it has produced at those facilities, 15 651.4 kg[31] (+714.7 kg since the Director General's previous report) of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235, of which 7845.4 kg (−869.3 kg since the Director General's previous report)[32] remain in the form of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235[33] and the rest has been further processed (see Annex IV).

D.1. Natanz

17. **Fuel Enrichment Plant**: FEP is a centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of low enriched uranium (LEU) enriched up to 5% U-235, which was first brought into operation in 2007. The plant is divided into Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to the design information submitted by Iran, eight units, each containing 18 cascades, were planned for Production Hall A, which totals approximately 25 000 centrifuges in 144 cascades. Currently, one unit contains IR-2m centrifuges; five contain IR-1 centrifuges; and the other two units do not contain centrifuges. Iran has not provided the corresponding design information for Production Hall B. The Agency continues to verify that Production Hall B does not contain any centrifuges.

18. In the unit containing IR-2m centrifuges, as of 22 August 2015, the situation remained unchanged from the Director General's previous report: six cascades had been fully installed with IR-2m centrifuges;[34] none of these cascades had been fed with natural UF_6; and preparatory installation work had been completed for the other 12 IR-2m cascades in the unit.

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[27] Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

[28] Up to the point at which it stopped, Iran had produced 447.8 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 (see Annex IV).

[29] In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material (e.g. some waste and samples) may not be subject to containment and surveillance.

[30] As declared by Iran in its design information questionnaires (DIQs) for the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz.

[31] This figure includes 115.6 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 that has been produced from the downblending of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235.

[32] This figure has decreased because Iran, in line with the JPA, fed 1584 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into the conversion process at the Enriched UO_2 Powder Plant (EUPP) prior to the JPA deadline, which at that time was 30 June 2015.

[33] This comprises nuclear material in storage as well as nuclear material in the cold traps and inside cylinders still attached to the enrichment process.

[34] The number of IR-2m centrifuges installed at FEP (1008) was also unchanged.

19. In the five units containing IR-1 centrifuges, as of 22 August 2015, the situation remained unchanged from the Director General's previous report: 90 cascades had been fully installed,[35] of which 54 were being fed with natural UF_6.[36] As previously reported, preparatory installation work had been completed for 36 IR-1 cascades in the two units not containing centrifuges.

20. As of 7 August 2015, Iran had fed 172 375 kg of natural UF_6 into the cascades at FEP since production began in February 2007 and produced a total of 15 056 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235.[37]

21. As of 24 November 2014, Iran had downblended about 4118 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 2% U-235 to natural uranium.[38]

22. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP,[39] and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant design information questionnaire (DIQ).

23. **Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant**: PFEP is a pilot LEU production, and research and development (R&D) facility that was first brought into operation in October 2003. It can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area currently being used for the production of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an area for R&D (Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5).

24. ***Production area***: As indicated in the Director General's previous reports, since the JPA took effect, Iran has ceased feeding Cascades 1 and 6 with UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 and is feeding them with natural UF_6 instead.[40] Since the JPA took effect, Iran has not operated Cascades 1 and 6 in an interconnected configuration.[41]

25. Between 20 January 2014 and 17 August 2015, Iran fed 1425.2 kg of natural UF_6 into Cascades 1 and 6 at PFEP and produced a total of 135.2 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235.[42]

26. In a letter dated 19 August 2015, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to conduct a "test run" involving the feeding of depleted uranium into either Cascade 1 or 6. On 22 August 2015, the Agency confirmed that Iran had started feeding Cascade 6 with depleted UF_6 and that Cascade 1 was under vacuum.

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[35] The number of IR-1 centrifuges installed at FEP (15 420) was also unchanged.

[36] GOV/2014/10, para. 22. The Agency has applied additional containment and surveillance measures to confirm that no more than the 54 IR-1 cascades (containing 9156 centrifuges) are being fed with nuclear material at FEP.

[37] Based on the amounts of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 verified by the Agency (as of 16 November 2014) and the amounts of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 estimated by Iran (covering the period from 17 November 2014 to 7 August 2015).

[38] This relates to one of Iran's undertakings in the JPA, as extended. The nuclear material originates from the tails produced by the enrichment of UF_6 up to 20% U-235 and from nuclear material evacuated from the cascades producing UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235, and is not included in the amount of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 indicated in para. 16.

[39] Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 17 May 2015.

[40] As of 23 August 2015, Cascades 1 and 6 contained a total of 328 IR-1 centrifuges (unchanged).

[41] GOV/2014/10, para. 28. The Agency has applied additional containment and surveillance measures to confirm that Cascades 1 and 6 are not interconnected.

[42] Based on the amounts of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 verified by the Agency (as of 13 September 2014) and the amounts of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 estimated by Iran (covering the period from 14 September 2014 to 17 August 2015).

27. ***R&D area***: Since the Director General's previous report, Iran has been intermittently feeding natural UF_6 into IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges, sometimes into single machines and sometimes into cascades of various sizes. The Agency has verified that one IR-5 centrifuge and one prototype IR-8 centrifuge[43] are in place but without connections.[44]

28. Between 18 May 2015 and 17 August 2015, a total of approximately 432.2 kg of natural UF_6 was fed into centrifuges in the R&D area, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails were recombined at the end of the process.

29. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at PFEP,[45] and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant DIQ.

D.2. Fordow

30. **Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant**: FFEP is a centrifuge enrichment plant that is currently being used for the production of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235.[46] The facility, which was first brought into operation in 2011, was designed to contain up to 2976 centrifuges in 16 cascades, divided between Unit 1 and Unit 2. All of the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines.

31. As previously reported, since the JPA took effect, Iran has ceased feeding UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into the four cascades of Unit 2 previously used for this purpose and is feeding them with natural UF_6 instead. Iran has also not operated these cascades in an interconnected configuration throughout the same period.[47] As of 23 August 2015, none of the other 12 cascades in FFEP had been fed with UF_6.[48]

32. As a result of the physical inventory verification (PIV) carried out by the Agency at FFEP between 24 January and 8 February 2015, the Agency verified, within measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility, the inventory of nuclear material as declared by Iran on 24 January 2015.[49]

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[43] GOV/2014/58, footnote 33.

[44] On 23 August 2015, there were two IR-1 centrifuges, 11 IR-4 centrifuges, one IR-5 centrifuge, 8 IR-6 centrifuges, one IR-6s centrifuge and one prototype IR-8 centrifuge installed in Cascade 2; eight IR-1 centrifuges, ten IR-2m centrifuges, ten IR-4 centrifuges and seven IR-6 centrifuges installed in Cascade 3; 164 IR-4 centrifuges installed in Cascade 4; and 162 IR-2m centrifuges installed in Cascade 5.

[45] Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 25 May 2015.

[46] GOV/2009/74, paras. 7 and 14; GOV/2012/9, para. 24. Iran has provided the Agency with an initial DIQ and three revised DIQs with different stated purposes for FFEP. In light of the difference between the original stated purpose of the facility and the purpose for which it is now being used, additional information from Iran is still required.

[47] GOV/2014/10, para. 36. The Agency has applied additional containment and surveillance measures at FFEP to confirm that only the four IR-1 cascades are used to enrich UF_6 and that they are not interconnected.

[48] The number of centrifuges installed at FFEP (2710) was also unchanged.

[49] GOV/2015/15, para. 32.

33. Between 20 January 2014 and 8 August 2015, Iran fed 3680.2 kg of natural UF_6 into the cascades at FFEP and produced a total of 344.6 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235.[50]

34. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FFEP,[51] and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant DIQ.

D.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities

35. Iran continues to provide the Agency with regular managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.[52] Such access, as well as associated mutually agreed information, was also provided by Iran pursuant to one of the practical measures agreed in relation to the Framework for Cooperation (see Annex I). As part of this managed access, Iran has also provided the Agency with an inventory of centrifuge rotor assemblies to be used to replace those centrifuges that fail. The Agency has analysed the information provided by Iran and, upon request, has received additional clarifications. Based on analysis of all the information provided by Iran, as well as the managed access and other verification activities carried out by the Agency, the Agency can confirm that, since the JPA took effect, centrifuge rotor manufacturing and assembly are consistent with Iran's replacement programme for failed centrifuges.[53]

E. Reprocessing Activities

36. Iran is required, pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council,[54] to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.[55] As previously reported, Iran stated in January 2014 that "during the first step time-bound (six months), Iran will not engage in stages of reprocessing activities, or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing".[56] In a letter to the Agency dated 27 August 2014, Iran indicated that this "voluntary measure" had been extended in line with the extension of the JPA.[57]

37. The Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)[58] and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.[59] The Agency carried out a PIV and a design information

[50] Based on the amounts of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 verified by the Agency (as of 24 January 2015) and the amounts of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 estimated by Iran (covering the period from 25 January 2015 to 8 August 2015).

[51] Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 8 April 2015.

[52] This relates to one of Iran's undertakings in the JPA.

[53] This relates to one of Iran's undertakings in the JPA.

[54] Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

[55] GOV/2013/56, footnote 28.

[56] This relates to one of Iran's undertakings in the JPA.

[57] As further extended (see footnote 13).

[58] The TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of targets and for research and training purposes.

[59] The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium, irradiated at TRR.

verification (DIV) at TRR on 18 August 2015, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 19 August 2015. The Agency can confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities with respect to TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access in Iran.

F. Heavy Water Related Projects

38. Iran is required, pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council,[60] to suspend work on all heavy water related projects.[61] Since the JPA took effect, Iran has neither installed any major components at the IR-40 Reactor nor produced nuclear fuel assemblies for the IR-40 Reactor at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP).

39. **IR-40 Reactor**: The IR-40 Reactor, which is under Agency safeguards, is a 40 MW heavy water moderated research reactor designed to contain 150 fuel assemblies containing natural uranium in the form of UO_2.

40. On 17 August 2015, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor and observed that, since the Director General's previous report, none of the reactor's remaining major components had been installed.[62] As previously reported, pursuant to one of the practical measures agreed in relation to the Framework for Cooperation, Iran concluded with the Agency a safeguards approach for the IR-40 Reactor in August 2014.[63]

41. **Heavy Water Production Plant**: The Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) is a facility for the production of heavy water with a design capacity to produce 16 tonnes of reactor-grade heavy water per year.

42. As previously reported, although the HWPP is not under Agency safeguards, the plant was subject to managed access by the Agency on 8 December 2013.[64] During the managed access, Iran also provided the Agency with mutually agreed relevant information. In addition, access to the heavy water storage location at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan in February 2014 enabled the Agency to characterize the heavy water.[65]

G. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication

43. Iran is conducting a number of uranium conversion and fuel fabrication activities at UCF, the Enriched UO_2 Powder Plant (EUPP), FMP and the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) at Esfahan, as indicated below, which are in contravention of its obligations to suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects,[66] notwithstanding that the facilities are under Agency safeguards.

[60] Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

[61] GOV/2013/56, footnote 32.

[62] GOV/2013/56, para. 34.

[63] GOV/2014/43, para. 46.

[64] GOV/2014/10, para. 13.

[65] GOV/2013/56, para. 39.

[66] Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

44. Since Iran began conversion and fuel fabrication at its declared facilities, it has, inter alia:

- Produced 550 tonnes of natural UF_6 at UCF, of which 185 tonnes have been transferred to FEP.
- Produced 13.8 tonnes of natural uranium in the form of UO_2 at UCF, of which 13.2 tonnes have been transferred to FMP.
- Transferred 6334 kg of natural UF_6 to EUPP. In addition, 6560 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 have been transferred from FEP to EUPP.
- Fed into the conversion process at EUPP 4304 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235.
- Fed into the R&D conversion process at UCF 53 kg of UF_6 enriched to 3.34% U-235 and produced 24 kg of uranium in the form of UO_2.[67]
- Fed into the conversion process at FPFP 337.2 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 and produced 162.8 kg of uranium in the form of U_3O_8.[68]
- Used 121.8 kg of uranium in the form of U_3O_8 produced at FPFP for the manufacture of fuel items for TRR.

45. **Uranium Conversion Facility**: UCF is a conversion facility for the production of both natural UF_6 and natural UO_2 from uranium ore concentrate (UOC). It is planned that UCF will also produce UF_4 from depleted UF_6, and uranium metal ingots from natural and depleted UF_4.

46. Since January 2014, Iran has neither produced natural uranium in the form of UO_2 through the conversion of UOC at UCF, nor has it transferred any natural uranium in the form of UO_2 from UCF to FMP.

47. As previously reported, Iran is conducting R&D activities at UCF on the recovery of uranium from liquid and solid scrap resulting from conversion activities at UCF. On 13 June 2015, the Agency observed that the recovery of uranium from such liquid scrap was ongoing.

48. Between 13 and 17 June 2015, the Agency carried out a PIV at UCF to verify the inventory as declared by Iran on 12 June 2015. The results of the PIV are currently being evaluated by the Agency.

49. **Enriched UO_2 Powder Plant**: EUPP is a facility for the conversion of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into UO_2 powder.[69] As previously reported, Iran began commissioning the facility in May 2014 using natural uranium. As part of the commissioning, as of 17 August 2015, Iran had fed a total of 6319 kg of natural UF_6 into the conversion process and produced 1828.8 kg of uranium in the form of UO_2. Since the plant began operations in July 2014, as of 17 August 2015, Iran had fed 4304 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into the conversion process for the production of UO_2 and produced 465.8 kg of uranium in the form of UO_2.

50. The Agency is still evaluating the results of the PIV that it carried out at EUPP between 4 and 6 April 2015.

[67] GOV/2012/55, para. 35.
[68] Unchanged since the Director General's previous report.
[69] GOV/2013/40, para. 45.

51. **Fuel Manufacturing Plant**: FMP is a facility for the fabrication of nuclear fuel assemblies for power and research reactors (see Annex IV).

52. In a letter dated 21 February 2015, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to conduct a "sinterability test on UO_2 sample powder" (enriched and natural)[70] in the form of "VVER-type UO_2 pellets", which it would produce for this purpose. As of 17 August 2015, the Agency verified that the production of samples of LEU VVER-type UO_2 pellets was ongoing.

53. On 18 August 2015, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at FMP and verified that Iran had continued its cessation of production of nuclear fuel assemblies using natural UO_2 for the IR-40 Reactor and that all of the fuel assemblies that had been produced previously remained at FMP.

54. **Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant**: FPFP is a facility for the conversion of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into U_3O_8 and the manufacture of fuel assemblies made of fuel plates containing U_3O_8 (see Annex IV).

55. As previously reported, Iran stated in January 2014 that "during the first step of time-bound (six months), Iran declares that there is no reconversion line to reconvert uranium oxide enriched up to 20% U-235 back into UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235".[71] In a letter to the Agency dated 27 August 2014, Iran indicated that this "voluntary measure" had been extended in line with the extension of the JPA.[72] Between 15 and 19 August 2015, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at FPFP during which it confirmed that there was no process line at the plant for the reconversion of uranium oxide into UF_6.

56. As previously reported, Iran has fed a total of 337.2 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 (227.6 kg of uranium) into the conversion process of FPFP. As of 19 August 2015, Iran had produced 162.8 kg of uranium in the form of U_3O_8 and generated solid and liquid scrap containing 55.4 kg of uranium. The remainder of the uranium that was fed into the process remains in the process and in waste. Of the 162.8 kg of uranium in the form of U_3O_8, Iran has used 121.8 kg to manufacture fuel items for TRR and generated 31 kg of solid scrap.

57. On 16 August 2015, the Agency observed that the process lines for the recovery of uranium from solid and liquid scrap at FPFP had yet to commence operation and that Iran was continuing to conduct R&D activities related to the recovery of uranium from solid scrap.

58. The Agency has verified that, as of 19 August 2015, Iran had produced at FPFP one experimental fuel assembly and 37 TRR-type fuel assemblies. Thirty of these fuel assemblies, including the experimental assembly, had been transferred to TRR.

H. Possible Military Dimensions

59. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.[73] The Agency has concerns about the possible

[70] Such tests are conducted for quality control purposes.

[71] This relates to one of Iran's undertakings in the JPA.

[72] As further extended (see footnote 13).

[73] For example: GOV/2011/65, paras. 38-45 and Annex; GOV/2011/29, para. 35; GOV/2011/7, Attachment; GOV/2010/10, paras. 40-45; GOV/2009/55, paras. 18-25; GOV/2008/38, paras. 14-21; GOV/2008/15, paras. 14-25 and Annex; GOV/2008/4, paras. 35-42.

existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. Iran is required to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.[74,75]

60. The annex to the Director General's November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65) provided a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency at that time, indicating that Iran had carried out activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. This information is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible.[76] The Agency obtained more information after November 2011 that further corroborated the analysis contained in that Annex.

61. In February 2012, Iran dismissed the Agency's concerns, largely on the grounds that Iran considered them to be based on unfounded allegations,[77] and in August 2014, Iran stated that "most of the issues" in the annex to GOV/2011/65 were "mere allegations and do not merit consideration".[78]

62. As indicated above (para. 7), on 14 July 2015, the Agency and Iran agreed on a Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme, as set out in the annex to the Director General's report of November 2011 (GOV/2011/65). As agreed in the Road-map, on 15 August 2015, Iran provided to the Agency its explanations in writing and related documents, on past and present outstanding issues. The Agency is reviewing this information.

63. Since the Director General's previous report, at a particular location at the Parchin site, the Agency has continued to observe, through satellite imagery, the presence of vehicles, equipment and probable construction materials.[79] In addition, a small extension to an existing building appears to have been constructed.[80] As previously reported, the activities that have taken place at this location since February 2012 are likely to have undermined the Agency's ability to conduct effective verification.[81] Full and timely implementation of the relevant parts of the Road-map is essential to clarify issues relating to this location at Parchin.[82]

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[74] Security Council resolution 1929, paras. 2 and 3.

[75] Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

[76] GOV/2011/65, Annex, Section B.

[77] GOV/2012/9, para. 8.

[78] GOV/2014/43, para. 64.

[79] The Agency has information provided by Member States indicating that Iran had constructed a large explosives containment vessel (chamber) at this location in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments. Such experiments would be strong indicators of possible nuclear weapon development (GOV/2011/65, Annex, paras. 49-51).

[80] The building referred to here is not the building housing the containment vessel (chamber building) (GOV/2013/6, para. 51).

[81] For a list of the most significant developments observed by the Agency at this location between February 2012 and the publication of the Director General's May 2013 report, see GOV/2012/55, para. 44; GOV/2013/6, para. 52; and GOV/2013/27, para. 55. Further developments were reported in the Director General's reports of May 2014 (GOV/2014/28, para. 59), September 2014 (GOV/2014/43, para. 67), and November 2014 (GOV/2014/58, para. 59).

[82] GOV/2011/65, Annex, Section C; GOV/2012/23, para. 5.

I. Design Information

64. Under the terms of its Safeguards Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council,[83] Iran is required to implement the provisions of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part concerning the early provision of design information.[84,85] Under the JCPOA, Iran has agreed to notify the Agency that it will "fully implement" the modified Code 3.1 "as long as the Safeguards Agreement remains in force".[86]

J. Additional Protocol

65. Under the terms of its Safeguards Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council,[87] Iran is required to implement the Additional Protocol.[88] Under the JCPOA, Iran "will notify the IAEA of provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol pending its entry into force, and subsequently seek ratification and entry into force, consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Parliament)".[89]

66. Implementation of the Additional Protocol by Iran is an essential prerequisite for the Agency to be able to reach a position where it could provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

K. Other Matters

67. On 18 August 2015, the Agency confirmed that 21 fuel assemblies, which had been produced in Iran and which contain uranium that was enriched in Iran up to 20% U-235, were in the core of TRR.[90] On the same date, the Agency observed that the Mini IR-40 prototype fuel assembly was in the storage pool.[91]

68. As of 19 August 2015, the Agency confirmed that one fuel plate (the same one as indicated in the Director General's previous reports), containing a mixture of U_3O_8 (enriched up to 20% U-235) and aluminium, remained at the MIX facility,

[83] Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

[84] In a letter dated 29 March 2007, Iran informed the Agency that it had suspended implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement (GOV/INF/2007/8). In accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran is further bound by para. 5 of Security Council resolution 1929 (2010).

[85] See GOV/2015/15, para. 65.

[86] JCPOA, Annex I, Section I., para. 65.

[87] Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

[88] Iran's Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003, although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006.

[89] JCPOA, Annex I, Section I., para. 64.

[90] On 18 August 2015, the core of TRR comprised a total of 33 fuel assemblies.

[91] GOV/2013/40, para. 64.

having been transferred from FPFP, and was being used for R&D activities aimed at optimizing the production of ^{99}Mo, ^{133}Xe and ^{131}I isotopes.[92]

69. On 11 and 12 July 2015, the Agency conducted an inspection and a DIV at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, at which time the reactor was operating at 100% of its nominal power.

L. Summary

70. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.[93]

71. On 14 July 2015, the Director General and the Vice-President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, HE Mr Ali Akbar Salehi, signed a Road-map aimed at the resolution, by the end of 2015, of all past and present outstanding issues.

72. On the same date, the E3/EU+3 and Iran agreed the JCPOA and, on 20 July 2015, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015), which, inter alia, requested the Director General to "undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA".

73. On 25 August 2015, the Board of Governors, inter alia, authorized the Director General to implement the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA, subject to the availability of funds and consistent with the Agency's standard safeguards practices.

74. Iran has provided to the Agency its explanations in writing and related documents, on past and present outstanding issues. The Agency is reviewing this information. The Director General will provide, for action by the Board of Governors, the final assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues by 15 December 2015.

75. The Agency continues to undertake monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear related measures set out in the JPA, as further extended.

76. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

[92] GOV/2013/40, para. 65.

[93] The Board of Governors has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that para. 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which corresponds to Article 2 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49 and GOV/OR.865, paras. 53-54).

Annex I

Practical Measures agreed by the Agency and Iran, for implementation by Iran, in relation to the Framework for Cooperation between November 2013 and May 2014

FIRST STEP: Six (Initial) Practical Measures, agreed on 11 November 2013

1. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Gchine mine in Bandar Abbas.

2. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Heavy Water Production Plant.

3. Providing information on new research reactors.

4. Providing information with regard to the identification of 16 sites designated for the construction of nuclear power plants.

5. Clarification of the announcement made by Iran regarding additional enrichment facilities.

6. Further clarification of the announcement made by Iran with respect to laser enrichment technology.

SECOND STEP: Seven Practical Measures, agreed on 9 February 2014

1. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Saghand mine in Yazd.

2. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Ardakan concentration plant.

3. Submission of an updated Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the IR-40 Reactor.

4. Taking steps to agree with the Agency on the conclusion of a Safeguards Approach for the IR-40 Reactor.

5. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and arranging for a technical visit to Lashkar Ab'ad Laser Centre.

6. Providing information on source material, which has not reached the composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, including imports of such material and on Iran's extraction of uranium from phosphates.

7. Providing information and explanations for the Agency to assess Iran's stated need or application for the development of Exploding Bridge Wire detonators.

THIRD STEP: Five Practical Measures, agreed on 20 May 2014

1. Exchanging information with the Agency with respect to the allegations related to the initiation of high explosives, including the conduct of large scale high explosives experimentation in Iran.

2. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and explanations related to studies made and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport and associated modelling and calculations and their alleged application to compressed materials.

3. Providing mutually agreed information and arranging a technical visit to a centrifuge research and development centre.

4. Providing mutually agreed information and managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.

5. Concluding the safeguards approach for the IR-40 Reactor.

Annex II

Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) agree, in continuation of their cooperation under the Framework for Cooperation, to accelerate and strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at the resolution, by the end of 2015, of all past and present outstanding issues that have not already been resolved by the IAEA and Iran.

In this context, Iran and the Agency agreed on the following:

1. The IAEA and Iran agreed on a separate arrangement that would allow them to address the remaining outstanding issues, as set out in the annex of the 2011 Director's General report (GOV/2011/65). Activities undertaken and the outcomes achieved to date by Iran and the IAEA regarding some of the issues will be reflected in the process.

2. Iran will provide, by 15 August 2015, its explanations in writing and related documents to the IAEA, on issues contained in the separate arrangement mentioned in paragraph 1.

3. After receiving Iran's written explanations and related documents, the IAEA will review this information by 15 September 2015, and will submit to Iran questions on any possible ambiguities regarding such information.

4. After the IAEA has submitted to Iran questions on any possible ambiguities regarding such information, technical-expert meetings, technical measures, as agreed in a separate arrangement, and discussions will be organized in Tehran to remove such ambiguities.

5. Iran and the IAEA agreed on another separate arrangement regarding the issue of Parchin.

6. All activities, as set out above, will be completed by 15 October 2015, aimed at resolving all past and present outstanding issues, as set out in the annex of the 2011 Director General's report (GOV/2011/65).

7. The Director General will provide regular updates to the Board of Governors on the implementation of this Road-map.

8. By 15 December 2015, the Director General will provide, for action by the Board of Governors, the final assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues, as set out in the annex of the 2011 Director General's report (GOV/2011/65). A wrap up technical meeting between Iran and the Agency will be organized before the issuance of the report.

9. Iran stated that it will present, in writing, its comprehensive assessment to the IAEA on the report by the Director General.

10. In accordance with the Framework for Cooperation, the Agency will continue to take into account Iran's security concerns.

Annex III

List of Declared Nuclear Facilities and LOFs in Iran

Tehran:

1. Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
2. Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility
3. Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL)

Esfahan:

4. Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR)
5. Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR)
6. Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR)
7. Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)
8. Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)
9. Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP)
10. Enriched UO_2 Powder Plant (EUPP)

Natanz:

11. Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
12. Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)

Fordow:

13. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)

Arak:

14. Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor)

Karaj:

15. Karaj Waste Storage

Bushehr:

16. Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP)

Darkhovin:

17. 360 MW Nuclear Power Plant

Shiraz:

18. 10 MW Fars Research Reactor (FRR)

LOFs:

Nine (all situated within hospitals)

Annex IV

Table 1: Summary of UF_6 Production and Flows

	Date	*Quantity*	*Enrichment*
Produced at UCF	August 2015	550 000 kg	Natural
Produced by downblending of UF_6 enriched up to 2% U-235	24 November 2014	7730 kg	Natural
Fed into FEP, PFEP and FFEP	August 2015	177 480.4 kg	Natural
Fed into EUPP	August 2015	6319 kg	Natural
Produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP	August 2015	15 535.8 kg	Up to 5%
Produced by downblending of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235	20 July 2014	115.6 kg	Up to 5%
Fed into PFEP	20 January 2014	1630.8 kg	Up to 5%
Produced at PFEP	20 January 2014	201.9 kg	Up to 20%
Fed into FFEP	20 January 2014	1806.0 kg	Up to 5%
Produced at FFEP	20 January 2014	245.9 kg	Up to 20%

Table 2: Inventory of UF_6 Enriched up to 20% U-235

Produced at FFEP and PFEP	447.8 kg
Fed into conversion process	337.2 kg
Downblended	110.0 kg*
Stored as UF_6	0.6 kg**

* The figure includes 1.6 kg that was previously downblended (GOV/2012/55, para. 16).

** This material is under Agency seal at Iran's declared enrichment facilities where it had been used as reference material for mass spectrometry.

Table 3: Conversion at UCF

Conversion process	*Quantity produced*	*Transferred to FMP*
UF_6 (~3.4% U-235) into UO_2	24 kg U	24 kg U
Natural UOC into UO_2	13 792 kg U*	13 229 kg U

* Uranium content in material qualified for fuel fabrication.

Table 4: Conversion of UF_6 Enriched up to 20% U-235 into U_3O_8 at FPFP

Feed quantity	*Quantity produced*
337.2 kg of UF_6 (227.6 kg U)	162.8 kg U

Table 5: Conversion of UF_6 into UO_2 at EUPP

Feed quantity	*Quantity produced*
6319 kg of natural UF_6 (4262.3 kg U)	1828.8 kg U*
4304 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 (2904.1 kg U)	465.8 kg U*

* The rest of the nuclear material is in different stages of the process.

Table 6: Fuel Manufacturing at FMP

Item	*Number produced*	*Enrichment*	*Item mass (g U)*	*Number irradiated*
Test fuel rod for IR-40 Reactor	3	Natural uranium	500	1
Test fuel rod	2	3.4%	500	–
Fuel rod assembly	2	3.4%	6 000	1
Mini IR-40 prototype fuel assembly	1	Natural uranium	10 000	1
IR-40 prototype fuel assembly	36	Natural uranium	35 500	Not applicable
IR-40 fuel assembly	11	Natural uranium	56 500	–

Table 7: TRR Fuel Fabrication at FPFP

Item	*Number produced*	*Enrichment*	*Item mass (g U)*	*Present at TRR*	*Irradiated*
TRR test plate (Natural Uranium)	4	Natural uranium	5	2	1
TRR test plate	5	19%	75	5	2
TRR control fuel assembly	10	19%	1 000	8	6
TRR standard fuel assembly	27	19%	1 400	21	16
Test assembly (with 8 plates)	1	19%	550	1	–

Annex V

Update on Iran's implementation of "voluntary measures" undertaken in relation to the Joint Plan of Action agreed between the E3+3 and Iran on 24 November 2013

1. The Agency confirms that since 20 January 2014, Iran has:

   i. not enriched uranium above 5% U-235 at any of its declared facilities;

   ii. not operated cascades in an interconnected configuration at any of its declared facilities;

   iii. diluted — down to an enrichment level of no more than 5% U-235 — 108.4 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235;[94]

   iv. fed 100 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into the conversion process at FPFP for conversion into uranium oxide;

   v. had no process line to reconvert uranium oxides back into UF_6 at FPFP;

   vi. not made "any further advances" to its activities at FEP, FFEP or the Arak reactor (IR-40 Reactor), including the manufacture and testing of fuel for the IR-40 Reactor;

   vii. provided an updated DIQ for the IR-40 Reactor and concluded with the Agency a safeguards approach for the reactor[95] (based on the updated DIQ and the safeguards measures agreed on 5 May 2014);

   viii. fed 4304 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into the conversion process at the EUPP for conversion into uranium oxide;[96]

   ix. continued its safeguarded enrichment R&D practices at PFEP, without accumulating enriched uranium;

   x. not carried out reprocessing related activities at TRR and the MIX Facility or at any of the other facilities to which the Agency has access;

   xi. provided information and managed access to the uranium mine and mill at Gchine,[97] to the Saghand Uranium Mine[98] and the Ardakan Uranium Production Plant;[99]

   xii. continued to provide daily access to the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow;

   xiii. provided regular managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities, and provided information thereon; and

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[94] For details, see GOV/INF/2014/26, footnote 4.
[95] On 31 August 2014.
[96] On 17 August 2015, the Agency verified that 465.8 kg of uranium in the form of UO_2 enriched up to 5% U-235 had been produced since the plant started operation.
[97] On 29 January 2014.
[98] On 6 May 2014.
[99] On 7 May 2014.

xiv. provided,[100] in relation to enhanced monitoring, the following:

- plans for nuclear facilities and a description of each building on each nuclear site;
- descriptions of the scale of operations being conducted for each location engaged in specified nuclear activities; and
- information on uranium mines and mills, and on source material.

2. In addition, the Agency confirms that since 24 July 2014, Iran has:

(i) used 68.8 kg of U_3O_8, converted from UF_6, enriched up to 20% U-235, for the manufacture of fuel items for TRR;[101]

(ii) used 0.084 kg of U_3O_8, converted from UF_6, enriched up to 20% U-235, for the manufacture of miniature fuel plates for ^{99}Mo production;[102] and

(iii) diluted about 4118 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 2% U-235 to the level of natural uranium.

[100] As of 20 April 2014: pursuant to Iran's undertaking to provide this information within three months of the JPA taking effect, i.e. 20 January 2014.

[101] The Agency has verified that, since 24 July 2014, an additional 13.2 kg of this U_3O_8 (6.2 kg prior to 24 November 2014 and 7.0 kg since that date), have been generated by and removed from the fuel fabrication process as scrap. Iran reported that this nuclear material, which remains at the facility, had not met the technical specification for fuel fabrication.

[102] In a letter dated 28 December 2014, Iran informed the Agency that FPFP was to start the production of miniature fuel plates for the MIX Facility for Mo^{99} production.

United Nations S/2015/706

Security Council

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Note by the President of the Security Council

At its 6335th meeting, held on 9 June 2010 in connection with the item entitled "Non-proliferation", the Security Council adopted resolution 1929 (2010).

In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to communicate to the Council all his reports on the application of safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Accordingly, the President circulates herewith the report of the Director General dated 14 August 2015 (see annex).

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Annex

Letter dated 21 August 2015 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to enclose herewith the report requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1929 (2010), which I have submitted today to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and the enclosed report to the attention of the members of the Council.

(*Signed*) Yukiya **Amano**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

Report by the Director General

Summary

This report considers the implications for the Agency of relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) with a view to commencing implementation of the verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments set out in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Recommended actions

It is recommended that the Board of Governors:

- take note of the Director General's report;
- authorize the Director General to implement the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA, and report accordingly, for the full duration of those commitments in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), subject to the availability of funds and consistent with the Agency's standard safeguards practices; and
- authorize the Agency to consult and exchange information with the Joint Commission, as set out in this report.

A. Recent developments

A.1. Framework for cooperation

1. On 2 July 2015, the Director General held meetings, in Tehran, with the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), HE Mr. Hassan Rouhani and the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, HE Mr. Ali Shamkhani, to advance work towards the resolution of all outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme, including clarification of possible military dimensions.

2. On 14 July 2015, the Director General and the Vice-President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, HE Mr. Ali Akbar Salehi, signed a "Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme" (hereafter referred to as the "Road-map").[1]

[1] GOV/INF/2015/14.

The "Road-map" identifies the necessary activities to be undertaken under the Framework for Cooperation, in order to accelerate and strengthen cooperation and dialogue between the Agency and Iran aimed at the resolution, by the end of 2015, of all past and present issues that have not already been resolved by the Agency and Iran.

3. By 15 December 2015, the Director General will provide, for action by the Board of Governors, the final assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues, as set out in the annex to his report of November 2011 (GOV/2011/65).

A.2. Joint Plan of Action and Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

4. As previously reported, on 30 June 2015, the E3+3 and Iran requested the Agency, on behalf of the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to continue to undertake the necessary nuclear-related monitoring and verification activities in Iran as set out in the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) "until further communication".[2,3]

5. On 14 July 2015, the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and Iran agreed on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[4] The provisions of the JCPOA state, inter alia, that it "builds on" the implementation of the JPA[5] and that the "full implementation of the JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme".

6. The Director General welcomed the JCPOA, stating that it would "facilitate the IAEA's further verification work in Iran".[6] He informed IAEA Member States that the Agency would be asked to "monitor and verify the nuclear-related measures set out in the agreement" and that he would then report to and consult the Board of Governors on this request and how to secure the necessary financial resources for the Agency.

B. Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

7. On 20 July 2015, the Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015) (the resolution), in which it endorsed the JCPOA. In the resolution, the Security Council,[7] inter alia, stated it is:

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[2] GOV/INF/2015/11, Attachment.

[3] It is expected that the Agency will continue conducting JPA-related activities, including the provision of monthly updates, until the date on which the JCPOA is implemented.

[4] The text of the JCPOA was communicated to the Director General by the Permanent Representatives to the IAEA of the E3+3 countries and Iran in a letter dated 24 July 2015 (INFCIRC/887).

[5] The text of the JPA is reproduced in INFCIRCs 855 and 856.

[6] 2015/Note 55, 14 July 2015.

[7] Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) makes provision for the termination of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) in accordance with its terms. Upon termination of the above referenced Security Council resolutions, the Board of Governors may wish to consider parallel action in regard to its decision (see GOV/2007/7 and GOV/OR.1181, paras. 40 and 41) and consequential decisions on technical cooperation provided to Iran, which were taken through the Agency's Technical Assistance and

"[s]trongly supporting the essential and independent role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of declared nuclear material to undeclared purposes and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and undeclared nuclear activities, and, in this context, in ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, including through the implementation of the "Framework for Cooperation" agreed between Iran and the IAEA on 11 November 2013 and the "Road-map for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues", and recognizing the IAEA's important role in supporting full implementation of the JCPOA." (Preamble)

8. In the resolution, the Security Council requested the Director General to:

(a) Undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments as set out in the JCPOA (para. 3);

(b) Provide regular updates to the Board of Governors and, as appropriate, in parallel to the Security Council, on Iran's implementation of its nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA (para. 4);

(c) Report to the Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council, at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of concern directly affecting fulfilment of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA (para. 4);

(d) Report to the Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council as soon as the Agency has verified that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraph 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA (para. 5); and

(e) Report to the Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council as soon as the Agency has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities (para. 6).

The Security Council also requested that the Agency and the Joint Commission[8] "consult and exchange information, where appropriate, as specified in the JCPOA" (para. 19).

B.1. Request for a meeting of the Board of Governors

9. In light of the above, the Director General requested that a meeting of the Board of Governors be convened on 25 August 2015 to consider the implications of relevant provisions of the resolution for the Agency, and the Director General's proposal to modify *The Agency's Programme and Budget 2016-2017* (GC(59)/2)[9] in respect of Major Programme 4, with a view to commencing implementation of the verification and monitoring in Iran that the Director General is requested to undertake pursuant to that resolution.

Cooperation Committee (based on GOV/2008/47/Add.3, GOV/2009/65, GOV/2011/58/Add.3 and GOV/2013/49/Add.3).

[8] The JCPOA establishes a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the E3/EU+3 and Iran (Annex IV of the JCPOA).

[9] See also "Modifications to *The Agency's Programme and Budget 2016-2017*" (GOV/2015/54).

C. Implications of the Security Council resolution for the Agency

C.1. Agency verification and monitoring

10. The Agency will continue its verification activities pursuant to Iran's Safeguards Agreement.[10] As set out in the JCPOA, Iran will notify the Agency (Annex I, Section L, of the JCPOA):

- of the provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, pending its entry into force, and subsequently seek ratification and entry into force, consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Parliament); and
- that it will fully implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement as long as the Safeguards Agreement remains in force.

The Agency's verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA is without prejudice to Iran's Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol thereto.

11. Subject to the authorization of the Board of Governors, the Director General will implement the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA (see para. 8.(a)) consistent with the Agency's standard safeguards practices. These verification and monitoring activities will commence on "Implementation Day". To facilitate the activities, the Agency will need to carry out "preparatory" activities between "Adoption Day" and "Implementation Day".[11]

C.2. Joint Commission

12. As indicated above (para. 8), the Agency and the Joint Commission are requested to "consult and exchange information, where appropriate, as specified in the JCPOA". The consultations and exchange of information between the Agency and the Joint Commission specified in the JCPOA are as follows:

(a) Information exchange:

- The Agency is expected to report to the Working Group of the Joint Commission that the construction of the modernised Arak reactor is consistent with the approved final design (Annex I, Section B.6).
- The Agency is expected to share, with the Joint Commission Participants, the content of the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, as submitted by Iran as part of its AP initial declaration (Annex I, Section I.52).
- The Agency is expected to receive, from the Coordinator of the Joint Commission, information relating to proposals submitted to the Commission by States seeking to engage in the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of nuclear-related items (Annex IV, Section 6.4.1).

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[10] The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.

[11] "Adoption Day" and "Implementation Day" are defined in the JCPOA, para. 34, (i) and (ii).

(b) Participation in meetings:

- The Agency may be invited to attend meetings of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission as an observer (Annex IV, Section 6.4.6).

13. The Agency will need to receive information from the Joint Commission which has a bearing on the Agency's implementation of the verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA. The Agency may also be requested to participate in other meetings of the Joint Commission as an observer.

D. Additional resources required by the Agency

14. The verification and monitoring activities requested of the Agency as set out above (paras. 4, 10 and 11) will incur costs to the Agency beyond those provided for in the Regular Budget,[12] as indicated below. All additional funding requirements until the end of 2016 will be met from extrabudgetary resources.[13]

15. The estimated costs for the period prior to "Implementation Day" are as follows:[14]

- €0.80M per month for the continued cost of activities necessary for the verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments under the JPA, covering the period between 1 October 2015[15] and "Implementation Day", to be funded by extrabudgetary resources;

- €0.16M per month for the preparatory activities related to the verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments, covering the period between "Adoption Day" (18 October 2015 or earlier) and "Implementation Day", to be funded by extrabudgetary resources.

16. The additional funding necessary for the activities in Iran from "Implementation Day" onwards is estimated to be €9.2M per annum. This estimate comprises €3.0M per annum for the provisional implementation of Iran's Additional Protocol and €6.2M per annum (of which, €2.2M per annum is for inspector costs) for verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA. The activities related to the latter estimate are foreseen as being applicable for fifteen years.

17. The cost of the provisional implementation of Iran's Additional Protocol (€3.0M per annum) and the inspector costs associated with the verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA (€2.2M per annum), totalling €5.2M per annum, will be unfunded in the Regular Budget in 2016 and will, therefore, need to be met from extrabudgetary resources. During preparations for the Agency's budget update for 2017, the Director General intends to consult Member States on the implications for the Regular Budget for 2017 and beyond.

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[12] *The Agency's Programme and Budget 2016-2017* (GC(59)/2).

[13] As indicated in GOV/2015/54.

[14] All of the figures in paragraphs 15 and 16 include programme support costs of 7%.

[15] The Secretariat estimates that existing voluntary contributions from Member States for activities related to the JPA will have been expended by the end of September 2015.

United Nations A/ES-10/690–S/2015/707

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
14 September 2015

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 14 September 2015 from the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

I write to draw your urgent attention to the rising tensions in Occupied East Jerusalem. The illegal actions and constant provocations and incitement by Israel, the occupying Power, including in particular by right-wing Israeli government officials, extremist settlers and religious zealots, against the Palestinian people, their land and their holy places are aggravating already high tensions, religious sensitivities and the fragile situation on the ground, threatening to ignite religious conflict and further destabilize the region, which is already experiencing unprecedented instability and upheaval.

For two consecutive days, extremist Israelis escorted by occupying forces broke into Al-Aqsa Mosque compound (Al-Haram Al-Sharif), the third holiest site in Islam, in Occupied East Jerusalem. Israeli occupying forces injured and detained Palestinian worshippers, prevented the entry of Palestinian worshippers and instigated violent confrontations, using tear gas, stun grenades and rubber-coated steel bullets. At least 110 Palestinian civilians, including worshippers, Mosque guards, reporters and cameramen, have been injured, and occupying forces obstructed ambulances from reaching the injured. Twenty of the injured have been transferred to the hospital, with three in critical condition who suffered injuries to the head and chest areas, including Anas Siyam, a Palestinian boy, who was hit with a rubber-coated steel bullet in the chest. Sheikh Omar Al-Kiswani, director of the compound, was also assaulted by Israeli occupying forces. Reports indicate that an elderly man was shot in the eye with a rubber-coated steel bullet and Tamer Khalaf, age 29, was assaulted and sprayed with toxic gas prior to being detained by occupying forces.

In this volatile context, on Sunday morning, 13 September, in an act of incitement and attempt to breach the sanctity of Al-Haram Al-Sharif, right-wing Israeli Minister of Agriculture Uri Ariel entered Al-Haram Al-Sharif, escorted by

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heavily armed Israeli occupying forces and more than 30 extremist Israeli settlers. Again, today, 145 extremist Israeli settlers broke into Al-Haram Al-Sharif via the Moroccan Gate, provoking worshippers and vandalizing the Mosque. Equally disturbing, Israeli occupying forces damaged Al-Haram Al-Sharif, breaking windows and partially burning prayer rugs due to gun fire inside the Mosque. In addition, Israel, the occupying Power, has imposed restrictions on Palestinians, denying almost all worshippers entry into the Holy Site, including children and women. Moreover, last week, Israeli War Minister Moshe Yaalon denied access to two Palestinian groups who wished to worship at Al-Haram Al-Sharif. Such provocative incidents only intensify and exacerbate religious sensitivities and the extremely fragile situation on the ground.

As we witness the persistent deterioration of conditions on the ground due to Israel's other illegal actions throughout Occupied Palestine and against the Palestinian civilian population, and in the absence of peace prospects, we are compelled again to provide a caution regarding the far-reaching risks of these provocations and incitement at Al-Haram Al-Sharif. We also underscore in this regard the recent statement by the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Mr. Nickolay Mladenov, who stressed, inter alia, that: "Political and religious leaders have a responsibility to act against extremists, who undermine the rule of law."

At the same time, we regret to inform you that illegal actions overtly intended to assert Israeli control over the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound also continue unabated, despite the calls and appeals against such actions. We firmly reject any provocative plans to spatially and temporally divide the compound. We reiterate the imperative of respect for the long-standing arrangements and historic status quo at Al-Haram Al-Sharif, as has been agreed to and respected by all parties for decades, and we recall the determination of the Security Council that all such measures by Israel, the occupying Power, "to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and in particular the recent 'basic law' on Jerusalem, are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith".

In this context, we reiterate that all illegal Israeli actions at Al-Haram Al-Sharif and throughout the rest of Occupied East Jerusalem are in violation of the numerous relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions calling for a cessation of Israeli policies and measures aimed at altering the character, legal status and demography of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in violation of international law, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits such actions. We appeal to the international community to act in word and deed to compel respect by Israel, the occupying Power, for all of its obligations under international law.

The Security Council, in accordance with its primary Charter duty for the maintenance of international peace and security, must give urgent attention to these disturbing developments and must call for an end to all provocations and incitement at Al-Haram Al-Sharif in Occupied East Jerusalem and throughout the rest of Occupied Palestine by Israel, the occupying Power, and its extremist Israeli settlers. It is clear that such actions are aimed at illegally and forcibly further entrenching Israeli control over Al-Haram Al-Sharif in Occupied East Jerusalem and must be rejected unequivocally. Moreover, it is clear that such actions risk the further destabilization of this fragile situation with unforeseen, dangerous consequences

that must be averted and must instead be replaced with serious efforts to calm the situation and revive the prospects for peace on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions, the Arab Peace Initiative and the international consensus on the two-State solution on the basis of the pre-1967 borders.

The present letter is in follow-up to our 552 previous letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which constitutes the territory of the State of Palestine. Those letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 11 September 2015 (A/ES-10/689-S/2015/703) constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations being committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine
to the United Nations

United Nations S/2015/708

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 September 2015
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 14 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to draw to your attention the following information.

Today, Tuesday 14 September 2015, armed terrorist groups perpetrated another crime against civilians in the city of Hasakah. At rush hour, two terrorist suicide bombers detonated a car bomb each, in the Khasham and Mahattah areas respectively. As of the time of writing, more than 20 civilians have been killed; 100 others, the majority of whom are women and children, have been seriously injured; significant damage has been done to private and public property; and three residential buildings have been destroyed.

This bloody terrorist crime took place at the start of the new school year when some four million students are enrolling in school in Syria. It is merely the latest in a series of systematic terrorist attacks perpetrated by armed terrorist groups, including Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Nusrah Front and the Army of Islam, with the aim of terrorizing civilians, making their lives impossible and preventing them from travelling to their jobs and schools. The attack is a response to the defeats inflicted on ISIL by the Syrian Arab Army, with assistance from the people of Hasakah, and to the group's expulsion from the city. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic underlines that these terrorist acts could not have occurred without the ongoing and direct support provided to the terrorist organizations by such States as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which are protected by certain Western countries that are known to all, not to mention the failure to adopt measures to curb the activities of State sponsors of terrorism.

We call on the Security Council to honour its commitment to combat terrorism and to pursue extremist terrorist groups by strengthening its cooperation and coordination with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, which has made every effort to fight terrorism in Syria for the sake of all peoples of the world and to uphold the values of humanity and bolster international peace and security.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reiterates that it is ready to combat terrorism and determined to fulfil its constitutional duty to defend and protect the Syrian people. It once more calls on the Security Council and the Secretary-General to condemn this criminal act and shoulder their responsibilities by combating terrorism, eradicating its sources of funding and implementing the

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relevant Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism, particularly resolutions 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014) and 2199 (2015).

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2015/709

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 September 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 11 September 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to my letters of 27 August 2015 (S/2015/669) and of 9 September 2015 (S/2015/696) conveying my recommendations, including elements of the terms of reference, on an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations joint investigative mechanism pursuant to Security Council resolution 2235 (2015). I also have the honour to refer to your letter of 10 September 2015 (S/2015/697) authorizing the recommendations, including elements of the terms of reference, regarding the establishment and operation of the Mechanism.

Following the usual consultations, and in coordination with the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Ahmet Üzümcü, I should like to inform you of my intention to appoint Virginia Gamba as head of the independent three-member panel to be set up to lead the Mechanism. She will assume overall responsibility, with two deputies responsible for the political and investigative components, respectively. Ms. Gamba is currently serving as Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Office for Disarmament Affairs.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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United Nations S/2015/710

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 September 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 15 September 2015 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 11 September 2015 (S/2015/709) concerning your intention to appoint Virginia Gamba as head of the independent three-member panel to be set up to lead the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Vitaly **Churkin**
President of the Security Council

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United Nations S/2015/711

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 September 2015

Original: English

France, Malaysia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular 1509 (2003), 2066 (2012), 2116 (2013), 2177 (2014), 2190 (2014), 2215 (2015) and 2237 (2015) concerning the situation in Liberia, as well as 2162 (2014) and 2226 (2015) on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire,

Affirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Liberia and recalling the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,

Affirming that the Government of Liberia bears primary responsibility for ensuring peace, stability and the protection of the civilian population in Liberia and for reforming the security sector, particularly the Liberia National Police (LNP) and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN),

Stressing that lasting stability in Liberia will require the Government of Liberia to sustain well-functioning and accountable government institutions, especially in the security and justice sectors, to build the confidence of all Liberians and *urging* the Government of Liberia to demonstrate substantive progress in the reform, restructuring and effective functioning of the security and justice sectors to provide for the protection of all Liberians,

Welcoming the overall progress towards restoring peace, security and stability in Liberia, *commending* the enduring commitment of the people and Government of Liberia to peace and to developing democratic processes and institutions and initiating important reform efforts, *recognizing* the effective response by the Government of Liberia, including with support from the international community, to the Ebola epidemic in Liberia and, in this regard, the resilience of the people and Government of Liberia and its security institutions and *calling on* all Liberian stakeholders to intensify momentum towards achieving greater social cohesion,

Looking forward to a comprehensive, inclusive constitutional review process as well as the implementation of the National Reconciliation Roadmap, *urging* efforts to strengthen the Independent National Commission on Human Rights, which could play a key role as a publicly accessible human rights institution and as a mechanism to monitor and follow-up on the implementation of the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and *stressing* that

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the responsibility for the preparation, security and conduct of free, fair and transparent 2017 presidential elections rests with the Liberian authorities,

Noting with concern the potential for conflict over Liberia's natural resources and disputes related to land ownership and *also noting* that issues related to corruption continue to threaten to undermine stability and the effectiveness of government institutions,

Commending the cooperation between, and significant efforts of, the Government of Liberia and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to plan and prepare for the 30 June 2016 security transition to the Liberian authorities, *expressing concern* that the Government has not provided predictable and sustainable funding to shoulder the costs of deploying and sustaining its security personnel and resources throughout the country, including to operate and maintain the LNP and BIN outside of Monrovia, and *welcoming* the commencement of arms marking by the Armed Forces of Liberia,

Commending the continued efforts of the Government of Liberia to strengthen security cooperation in the subregion, notably with the governments of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, and *recognizing* that the instability in western Côte d'Ivoire continues to pose cross-border security challenges for Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire,

Expressing appreciation for the continued assistance provided by the people and Government of Liberia to Ivorian refugees in eastern Liberia and towards their voluntary repatriation to Côte d'Ivoire,

Extolling the continued contribution, commitment and resolve of United Nations personnel, as well as of the troop- and police-contributing countries of UNMIL, to assist in consolidating peace and stability in Liberia,

Expressing appreciation to the international community, including the Economic Community of West African States, African Union and Mano River Union, for their support to consolidate peace, security and stability in Liberia, *welcoming*, in particular, the contributions of bilateral partners and multilateral organizations, as well as the Peacebuilding Commission, to support Liberia's efforts on security sector reform (SSR), rule of law and national reconciliation, as well as in the post-Ebola recovery period, *strongly encouraging* the continued contributions of the international community in this regard, *recognizing* that key peacebuilding priorities must be fully integrated in the post-Ebola recovery efforts, including revitalizing socioeconomic development and *emphasizing* the need for coherence between, and integration of, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development to achieve an effective response to post-conflict situations,

Recognizing the significant challenges that remain across all sectors, including continuing problems with violent crime, in particular the high rates of sexual and gender-based violence, especially involving children, *recalling* its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), and 2106 (2013) on women, peace, and security, *welcoming* the renewed efforts by the Government of Liberia to promote and protect human rights, in particular of women and children and *emphasizing* that persistent barriers to full implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) will only be dismantled through dedicated commitment to women's empowerment, participation, and human rights, and through concerted leadership,

consistent information and action, and support, to build women's engagement in all levels of decision-making,

Taking note of the 13 August 2015 report of the Secretary-General (S/2015/620) and the recommendations contained therein on the adjustments to the mandate and composition of UNMIL in line with the security transition,

Determining that the situation in Liberia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Governance, Rule of Law, Security Sector Reform and National Reconciliation

1. *Emphasizes* that the Government of Liberia bears primary and ultimate responsibility for security and the protection of its population and *urges* the Government to prioritize the effective and rapid development of the security agencies, especially the LNP, which is the priority law enforcement agency tasked with civilian policing responsibilities, including through the timely provision of sufficient financial resources and other support, adequate training and development of senior management;

2. *Encourages* the Government of Liberia to prioritize national reconciliation and economic recovery, to combat corruption and to promote efficiency and good governance, in particular by continuing to strengthen transparency and accountability, including by managing effectively Liberia's natural resources, *emphasizes* the importance of pursuing a national reconciliation and social cohesion strategy through concrete measures to promote national healing, justice and reconciliation at all levels and involving all Liberian stakeholders and *recognizes* the efforts of the Government of Liberia to support enhancing the participation of women in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, including in decision-making roles in post-conflict governance institutions and the broad range of reform efforts;

3. *Emphasizes* the need for continued progress by the Liberian authorities on constitutional and institutional reforms, especially of the rule of law and security sectors, and the national reconciliation processes, particularly in light of the impact of the Ebola outbreak on communities and the need to intensify the longer-term recovery of Liberia and, in this regard, *requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to continue to assist such efforts through the use of good offices and political support;

4. *Urges* the Government of Liberia to intensify its efforts towards achieving progress on the transition of security responsibilities from UNMIL to the national authorities, particularly with regard to prioritizing and resourcing the critical gaps to facilitate a successful transition, improving the capacity and capability of the LNP and BIN, as well as the justice sector, including courts and prisons, enabling the promotion of human rights and reconciliation, effective oversight, professionalism, transparency and accountability across all security institutions and strengthening democratic institutions and extension of state authority and services throughout the country for the benefit of all Liberians;

5. *Affirms its expectation* that the Government of Liberia will assume fully its complete security responsibilities from UNMIL no later than 30 June 2016 and

encourages Member States and multilateral organizations to continue to provide financial, technical and other assistance to the Government of Liberia in this regard, including for the long-term support necessary for professionalizing and sustaining Liberia's security institutions and infrastructure;

6. *Calls on* the Government of Liberia to accelerate its efforts to enhance the capacity of its security sector in coordination with the continued reconfiguration of UNMIL, especially the leadership, coordination, monitoring and resources, oversight mechanisms, early passage of the draft Police and BIN Acts and further reform of the promotion and manpower policies, with a view to decentralizing the national security institutions, particularly the LNP, to provide security for all people throughout Liberia and *urges* the Government of Liberia to accelerate efforts to implement measures on the proper management of arms and ammunition, including enacting the appropriate domestic laws, the effective monitoring and management of Liberia's border regions and the registering and tracking of arms and material used and imported by its security forces;

7. *Underscores* the importance of the Government of Liberia continuing to develop national security and rule of law institutions that are fully and independently operational, and to this end, *encourages* accelerated coordinated progress on the implementation of the Security and Justice Development Plans and the National Human Rights Action Plan and *urges* the effective, transparent and efficient management by the Government of Liberia of assistance, including from bilateral and multilateral partners, to support the reform of the justice and security sectors;

8. *Expresses its continued concern* that women and girls in Liberia continue to face a high incidence of sexual and gender-based violence, *reiterates its call on* the Government of Liberia to continue to combat sexual violence, particularly against children, and gender-based violence and to combat impunity for perpetrators of such crimes and to provide redress, support and protection to victims, including through public information campaigns and by continuing to strengthen national police capacity in this area and to raise awareness of existing national legislation on sexual violence and *encourages* the Government to reinforce its commitment in this regard, including by funding the implementation of its national action plan on sexual and gender-based violence and improving women and girls' access to justice;

UNMIL mandate

9. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNMIL until 30 September 2016;

10. *Decides* that the mandate of UNMIL shall be the following:

(a) *Protection of Civilians*

(i) To protect, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Liberian authorities, the civilian population from threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment;

(b) *Reform of Justice and Security Institutions*

(i) To assist the Government of Liberia in implementing and in close coordination with bilateral and multilateral partners, as appropriate, its national strategy on Security Sector Reform (SSR);

(ii) To advise the Government of Liberia on SSR and the organization of the LNP and BIN, as well as on the justice and corrections sector, with a particular focus on developing their leadership, internal management and accountability mechanisms;

(iii) To assist the Government of Liberia to coordinate these efforts with all partners, including bilateral and multilateral donors;

(c) *Human Rights Promotion and Protection*

(i) To carry out promotion, protection and monitoring activities of human rights in Liberia, with special attention to violations and abuses committed against children and women;

(ii) To support the strengthening of efforts by the Government of Liberia to combat sexual- and gender-based violence, including its efforts to combat impunity for perpetrators of such crimes;

(d) *Protection of United Nations personnel*

(i) To protect the United Nations personnel, installations and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;

11. *Decides* that UNMIL, in accordance with paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 10 (b) above, shall put renewed focus on supporting the Government of Liberia to achieve a successful transition of complete security responsibility to the Liberian authorities by strengthening the capacity of the relevant security agencies to manage existing personnel and to improve training programs to expedite their readiness to assume security responsibilities throughout Liberia and *requests* UNMIL to continue to communicate, including through UNMIL Radio, with the people and Government of Liberia to raise awareness and understanding about its mandate and activities in line with the security transition;

12. *Requests* UNMIL to ensure that any support provided to non-United Nations security forces is provided in strict compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to non-United Nations Security Forces (S/2013/110);

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that UNMIL has the requisite qualified specialist advisers with the professional skills and experience appropriate to this transition phase in order to enhance mentoring with the aim of increasing the capacity of the Government, particularly the LNP and BIN, to accelerate the implementation of sustainable rule of law, justice, governance and SSR programs, including mechanisms to hold perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence accountable;

14. *Encourages* UNMIL, within its capabilities and areas of deployment and without prejudice to its mandate, to continue to assist the Government of Liberia, the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 1521 (2003) and the Panel of Experts to carry out its tasks, in this regard, as set forth in previous resolutions, including its resolution 2237 (2015);

Force structure

15. *Decides* to decrease UNMIL's authorized military strength from 3,590 to 1,240 military personnel, which includes one infantry battalion and related enablers, by 30 June 2016 and to decrease UNMIL's authorized police strength from 1,515 to 606 police personnel, which includes three formed police units, as well as immigration and police advisers, by 30 June 2016;

16. *Requests* UNMIL, from 1 July 2016, to support the Liberian security agencies to protect civilians in the event of a deterioration of the security situation that could risk a strategic reversal of peace and stability in the country, taking into account UNMIL's reduced capabilities and areas of deployment;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to streamline the activities of UNMIL across its civilian, police and military components and narrowing of the mandate decided in this resolution and *further requests* the Secretary-General to accelerate efforts to achieve the consolidation of the civilian, police and military presence of UNMIL in line with the security transition;

18. *Affirms its intention*, based on the Security Council's review by 15 December 2016 of Liberia's overall capacity to ensure security and stability after the conclusion of the security transition on 30 June 2016 and security conditions on the ground, to consider the possible withdrawal of UNMIL and transition to a future United Nations presence to continue to assist the Government of Liberia to consolidate peace and, in this regard, *requests* the Secretary-General to conduct an assessment mission to Liberia in order to provide recommendations to the Security Council by 15 November 2016;

Regional and inter-mission cooperation

19. *Recognizes* the importance of resuming fully and also enhancing the joint activities between the Governments of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire as UNMIL and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) downsize, *calls on* the Governments of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire to continue reinforcing their cooperation, particularly with respect to the border area, including through increased monitoring, information sharing, and coordinated actions, and in implementing the shared border strategy to, inter alia, support the disarmament and repatriation of armed elements on both sides of the border and the voluntary return of refugees in safety and dignity, as well as to address the root causes of conflict and tension, and in this regard, *calls upon* all United Nations entities in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, including all relevant components of UNOCI and UNMIL, within their respective mandates, capabilities and areas of deployment, as well as the two United Nations Country Teams, where relevant and appropriate, to intensify support to the Ivorian and Liberian authorities;

20. *Affirms* the importance of inter-mission cooperation arrangements as UNMIL and UNOCI downsize, *reaffirms* the inter-mission cooperation framework set out in its resolution 1609 (2005), *recalls* its endorsement in its resolution 2062 (2012) of the recommendation of the Secretary-General to transfer three armed helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI to be used in both Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia along and across their border and *also recalls* its decision in its resolution 2162 (2014) that all UNOCI and UNMIL military utility helicopters shall be utilized in

both Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia in order to facilitate rapid response and mobility, while not affecting the area of responsibility of either mission;

21. *Welcomes* the full operationalization of the quick reaction force established by its resolution 2162 (2014) to implement UNOCI's mandate as defined in paragraph 19 of its resolution 2226 (2015) and to support UNMIL as defined in paragraph 33 of its resolution 2226 (2015) while recognizing that this unit will remain primarily a UNOCI asset;

22. *Recalls* its authorization, pursuant to its resolutions 2162 (2014) and 2226 (2015), to the Secretary-General to deploy this unit to Liberia, subject to the consent of the troop contributing countries concerned and the Government of Liberia, in the event of a serious deterioration of the security situation on the ground in order to temporarily reinforce UNMIL with the sole purpose of implementing its mandate and *further recalls* its requests to the Secretary-General to inform the Security Council immediately of any deployment of this unit to Liberia and to obtain Security Council authorization for any such deployment for a period that exceeds 90 days;

Reports of the Secretary-General

23. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed of the situation in Liberia and the implementation of the mandate of UNMIL and to provide to it a midterm report no later than 28 February 2016 and a final report no later than 15 August 2016 on the situation on the ground and implementation of this resolution;

24. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.